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2.
SOCIAL ACCEPTANCE
2.1
How to achieve public opinion in favour of road pricing
There
are no simple solutions for obtaining acceptability for road pricing measures.
However, in terms of public acceptability at least some general rules
should be considered in order to make an implementation of a transport
pricing measure more likely. (cp. Schlag & Teubel, 1997; Schade, Schlag,
et.al., 2000, Schlag & Schade, 2000). These shall be reported in the next
section. More specific a communication strategy as one of the main pillars
of the introduction procedure has to be designed which ÒsellÒ the measures.
In a broader context the whole decision process affects the public opinion.
Thus, a tentative process structured into stages which considers acceptability
will be reported in section 3.2.4. Finally, one successful introduction
of road pricing in the light of "getting the public opinion in favour
of road pricing" shall be presented.
2.1.1
General Rules
The
objectives of the pricing strategy have to meet main public concerns.
Politicians and the public regard traffic problems in cities as a very
important and urgent issue. There is a search for solutions. Thus, marginal
cost pricing should give rise to environmental benefits and congestion
reduction (and these have to be communicated), safety contributions and
other advantages should be perceived and it should meet positive social
norms (Goodwin, 1989). A number of guidelines to successful implementation
can, therefore, be suggested.
- Pricing
strategies have to be perceived as very effective solutions, if not
as the only effective solution for the perceived traffic problems. People
are used to regard public roads as ÒfreeÒ goods, therefore there will
be strong emotional resistance to any attempt to charge for them. If
you want people to accept charging for road use or parking there must
be very good and convincing reasons. Perhaps the best reason is, that
this is the best way of solving perceived urgent problems. The effectiveness
of transport pricing may be high but this is not guaranteed and depends
on the definition of objectives. The efficiency will be comparatively
very high - from the citiesÕ, but not from the motoristsÕ point of view.
Thus, not only the objectives of the intended measures must be valued
highly by the public, people must also believe that their behaviour
contributes to reach these objectives. The values as well as the expectations
(the perceived probability to reach these objectives) should be made
transparent and first trials of a new behaviour must be successful so
that the new behaviour is perceived as effectively contributing to reach
the shared values, thus creating positive contingencies between the
behaviour and its consequences.
- Revenues
must be hypothecated and alternatives have to be provided. People want
to get something for their money. Thus, there must be a package solution,
combining traffic restraints and road charging with a set of transport
and environmental improvements (cp. Jones, 1998; Schlag & Schade, 2000).
- Fairness
issues have to be considered very carefully. The system must be perceived
as fair in particular relating to the personal cost-benefit-relation.
The benefits people see for themselves must balance their costs at least
in an immaterial way (e.g. by reaching other valuable objectives). In
addition people should not feel to be treated unjust in comparison to
others. An important role plays in this context the use of the revenues.
With the help of the raised charges it is possible to influence the
distributional impacts in the desired direction. Hypothecation of the
revenues must result in guaranteeing a desired level of mobility for
all, even supporting mobility chances for some groups thus meeting equity
issues on a population level (Bannister, 1994; Guiliano, 1994; Langmyhr,
1997; Schade et al., 2000)
- Charging
only new facilities can be a rather easy way to introduce road pricing.
Using road pricing only for new infrastructure has a better chance of
acceptance, as there is a net benefit form the new investment.
- Public
acceptability can only be expected if people have confidence among others
in the effectiveness of the measure, the use of the revenues, the fairness
and anonymity of the system. One precondition to support confidence
is transparency of the intended measures at an early stage. Connected
to transparency, for the acceptability of any change you have to create
some commitment of people to the new ideas, perhaps creating some identification
with the proposed package of measures. This commitment depends on early
and credible communication, on positive experiences (at least by models),
on the conviction that this is an effective solution, and on perceived
chances of participation. People want to see themselves as having at
least some degree of control over the things they are affected by. Thus
there is a connection between participation, commitment, acceptability
and later effectiveness. This points out the importance of early information
and participation of people even in concept development. A second precondition
for creating confidence is defined responsibility. Who will be responsible
for the functioning of the system, for charging and accounting, for
revenue allocation, for failures and undesired effects? This has to
be defined clearly before implementing the system. Responsibility issues
are of particular relevance in connection with the debate of privatisation.
And finally, to meet the above requirements it is necessary to design
a strategy to communicate the measures.
- The
necessary publicity calls for an intelligent communication strategy.
2.1.2
Some Communication Principles
The
communication strategy only works if it covers the whole package. From
a psychological point of view a successful communication strategy should
- among others - reflect the following principles:
- All
the externalities have to be discussed in advance: creating awareness
for the problem, then presenting a package of credible solutions.
- Positive
objectives must be connected with most effective solutions to reach
them. Thus transport pricing has to be communicated as a very effective
means to reach commonly shared goals. This can make private costs more
acceptable.
- There
must be personally positive experiences in first trials changing the
transport mode, e.g. time savings, less parking problems, ecological
advantages, the possibility to participate in solving traffic problems,
attraction of inner-cities etc. Positive experiences on first trials
help to get used to the new behaviour. If the first experiences with
a newly implemented system have to be positive to hold them, then investments
in public transport must go ahead before pricing is introduced to reduce
painful first experiences and to have the capacities available.
- The
communication has to point out the positive sides of the package, ie
the uses for which the road charges are used. This connection between
push and pull - measures (see hypothecation) was not given in a sufficient
way in former road pricing strategies (eg in Stuttgart, Germany) or
it was not communicated transparently enough. (FAW, 1995).
- People
must feel to have a choice, even if the choice alternatives are restricted
and the inputs of their decisions have changed. If they only feel to
be forced to compliance, some of them will show reluctance, a strong
motive to change the situation for themselves and to restore former
perceived possibilities to choose between alternatives. Crucial is the
perceived freedom of choice (Weiner, 1993).
- If
you can not convince people, external control to enforce the desired
measures has to be very strong. But this external control will only
work if a great majority of people generally agree with the measures
and accept that people offending against these measures are enforced
and punished. This will certainly work if no more than 20 or 30 per
cent of all the people targeted oppose the measure. Thus you have to
convince a great majority of road users and even of car drivers. The
conviction of a great majority is not only a precondition for the acceptance
of the measure, but also a precondition for the acceptance of the control
against offenders.
- In
addition positive information should be disseminated which corresponds
with the desired attitudes and behaviour and negative information for
undesired.
- Achieving
changes in normative values is another strong element for establishing
the new behaviour. Creating new norms on a collective and new intentions
on a personal level may motivate to behave in a new manner to meet these
new beliefs. But that must be experienced as valuable in a material
and in an immaterial sense. Generally, the perception of the situation
has to be changed - and this will influence the behaviour of people.
- The
pricing scheme, and supporting measures must develop a new transport
system, offering real alternatives (bus, tram, shared modes of transport),
which are well known (information) and attractive in terms of price,
convenience, availability and accessibility etc. Constraints to changes
in behaviour must be identified and eliminated. Thereby mobility should
not been diminished by transport pricing. Such a favourable situation
is a precondition to break old habits and to realise new intentions.
Thus positive first experiences with alternatives (in mode, time, route
choice) can be understood as a learning exercise which demonstrated
what can be gained from changed behaviour. In the first instance, positive
expectations, positive values and positive outcomes may be partly communicated
by models which explain the scheme, and get vicarious rewards (Bandura,
1977).
- The
pricing message has to be communicated by very credible communicators
(credible from the point of view of car drivers and other users).
2.1.3
Identification Of Stakeholders
It
is important for cities to identify the key stakeholders, and to establish
whether or not they support the introduction of pricing. Europrice Technical
Paper 3 suggests that the most important stakeholders groups are:
- public
transport,
- motoring
organisation,
- freight
transport industry,
- cycling
and pedestrian organisation,
- road
safety agencies,
- vehicle
manufacturing and service industry,
- manufacturing,
- trade
unions,
- environmental
organisations,
- civic
societies,
- interest
groups (disabled people, elderly, women),
- chambers
of commerce,
- health,
- financial
institutions,
- public
services,
- retail,
- leisure/tourist
organisations,
- employers;
and
- education
establishment
Added
to this list, of course, should be the general public. The most supportive
groups are likely to be public transport, cycling and pedestrian organisations,
environmental organisations and employers. Traditionally, the most non-supportive
organisations are: motoring organisations, civic societies, interest groups
(unless exempt) and the retail sector. In the UK, however, there is a
growing acceptance that increasing congestion is leading to severe delays
for drivers, and there is some support for pricing amongst the business
community and motoring organisations provide that revenues are clearly
ring-fenced to provide improved facilities. Similarly the view was Òno,
but it is a necessary evil (Trondheim).Ó The retail sector might be more
in favour when toll only has to be paid during rush hour. The chance for
success for the urban pricing project will increase if the traffic problem
is evident and the stakeholders are aware of this problem. The stakeholders
should be involved in planning alternative transport. Road pricing and
alternative transport, including improved public transport, should be
part of a road pricing package. This package can also compensate groups
whose welfare will decrease by the road pricing scheme. The stakeholders
should be involved and consulted from the beginning and all the way through
the process.
2.1.4
The Process Structured Into Stages
The
PRIMA project separates three rather schematic stages of a process aiming
at the introduction of a road pricing scheme (Harsman, PŠdam, Wijkmark,
2000, 61-62). The first stage is political and strategic, the second consists
of iterative assessments, and the third is oriented towards implementation
and monitoring activities.
- Stage
I: This stage starts with the identification and characterisation of
a traffic/ transport problem. On this basis a project idea can be formulated
by an assigned project management group (project organisation). At the
same time the political system has (i) to provide legitimacy to the
decision process, (ii) to establish compatibility of views expressed
on the local, regional and national levels. At this stage a preliminary
feasibility study can be carried out and the major results could be
disseminated to the public and discussed in various forms. A final step
in the first stage is to identify interest groups and design the decision
process accordingly.
- Stage
II: In the second phase a project organisation is formed to (i) make
comprehensive assessment studies that generate alternative solutions,
(ii) assess the different alternatives, identify potential winners and
losers. At this stage it is meaningful to establish an information channel,
by which the project organisation can communicate alternatives with
the community (voters, stakeholders and other actors). In this context
opposing groups may be invited to select an attached committee that
can interact with the project organisation. Ideally, this interaction
should result in a consensus about the nature of the transport problems
and the set of effective (alternative) solutions. Finally, the end result
of the second stage is the formulation of a plan for sequential decision-making.
- Stage
III: The third stage may be thought of as the Òimplementation phaseÓ.
This requires that the project organisation (project team) reorients
itself to carry out the implementation and organise a systematic monitoring
of consequences over time. In this stage project-management issues may
dominate the process. An important task of the monitoring is to follow
the ex post acceptance and to suggest further developments of the introduced
system.
2.1.5
One Practical Example:
The
Oslo Toll Ring In the mid-eighties, the city of Oslo was confronted with
unsatisfactory traffic flow with significant delays for all. Besides,
there were local environmental problems with traffic hold ups and pressure
on local streets and residential roads. The public funds for road construction
were insufficient. To allow the financing of a road investment program,
authorities decided to seek the required additional resources from users.
The toll ring was to contribute to the implementation of different projects
within 15 years, as opposed to 35 years financed by public grants. Through
the first part of the eighties there was an excited discussion. Different
ways of payment were considered like petrol tax, a local toll ring for
the Oslo tunnel, increased parking fees and an area based road tax. Two
different motives were proposed:
- To
provide money for constructing roads and other transport infrastructure.
- To
limit car traffic, completely or in rush hours only.
The
political process towards implementation was difficult. Four years before
the implementation, Oslo City Council and Akershus County Council passed
a principle approval about tolls based on motivation 1. Two years later
the toll ring passed the formal political approval. Just before that the
Norwegian Parliament had changed the law. As a result of this law change,
equivalent toll rings were also established in Bergen and Trondheim. After
the principal political agreement followed a discussion about localisation.
Here one had to combine fairness, maximum of income and practicability
(e.g. available land to build toll stations). 210,000 of OsloÕs inhabitants
live outside the toll ring. In addition, approximately 200,000 of the
regionÕs remaining population frequently go to Oslo city centre. A discussion
occurred of who would have to pay and who would not have to pay to go
to the city centre. The local majority consisted of the two largest political
parties, the social democrats and the conservatives. Certain issues caused
strong internal dissension. For example, a considerable group of young
people within the labour party demanded that 30% of the revenues were
to be allocated to public transport investments. The conservative party
considered this breaking the initial agreement. This crisis was solved
partly by a warning from the national authorities about a possible termination
of national road and railway investments.
Two
different factors made the agreement possible at last:
- Opposite
regards gave the same substantial solution. The supporters of road construction
were satisfied by the official arguments, while those against road construction
wanted the toll ring because it would make an opportunity to limit the
number of cars into the city when it was established.
- Local
disagreement checked by public financial pressure. Fear of losing national
grants made municipal politicians willing to make a compromise.
2.1.6
Public Acceptability Of Tolls
Norway
has a long tradition of using road tolls as a way of financing road investments.
It is politically accepted in all parties. Before the extensive toll systems
were implemented in the cities, there were tolls on bridges and tunnels
connecting the islands to the mainland. There is no general acceptability
of road pricing as a demand management measure. In general it has to be
noted that attitudes before the implementation of the toll ring are based
more on expectations and estimations rather than on real experiences with
the system ('acceptability'). In contrast to the cross-sectioned stated
acceptability the revealed behaviour after the introduction of the system
('acceptance') can be seen as a process of dealing with the adaptation
to the new mobility situation. In the year before the implementation of
the toll ring, 70% of the cityÕs population were negative towards the
toll ring (see Figure 2.1). When the system had been operative for one
year this opposition had been reduced to 64%. In 1998 this figure was
54%. The share being very negative has decreased from 40 to 17 percent
during the same period. The share being positive to the toll system has
steadily increased during the period, from 30 percent before the toll
system opened to 46 percent in 1998.
Figure
2.1: Development Of Attitudes Towards The Oslo Toll Ring (Norwegian Public
Roads Administration Et Al. 1999, 9)
The
data show that public acceptance increases with successful implementation,
thus showing, that it is possible to raise acceptance by implementing
a carefully selected road pricing scheme.
2.1.7
Influencing Public Behaviour
Before
introducing road pricing measures, alternative mobility-opportunities
or modes of transport have to be provided. These alternative modes of
transport must already be available, attractive and well-known so that
new mobility behaviour is a positive experience, which - in turn - is
most important when the road users change the mode of transport for the
very first time. Of further importance is that behaviour can be shown
in accordance with specific intentions and that the personal benefits
of the behaviour outweigh its costs. In such way new habits, together
with new normative behaviour expectations, can develop.
When considering the road users' cost-benefit-calculations it is usually
assumed that road users always calculate in a rational way, i.e. that
before deciding for a specific behaviour they weigh up its advantages
and disadvantages, and this also in comparison to other possible behaviours.
So for a modification of the road usersÕ cost-benefit-calculations in
order to influence behaviour there are four different options (see Table
3.1):
- to
decrease the expected benefits of a undesired behaviour (e.g. restrict
parking);
- to
decrease the expected costs of the desired behaviour (e.g. reduced prices
of public transport, stations which are easy to reach etc.);
- to
increase the expected benefits of the desired behaviour (e.g. bonus
for less vehicle km)
- to
increase the expected costs of the undesired behaviour (e.g. road charges)
Table
2.1: The Variation Of The Road Users' Cost-Benefit-Calculation
| |
Benefits
|
Costs
|
| Undesired
behaviour |
1
|
4
|
| Desired
behaviour |
3
|
2
|
But,
in contrast to the assumptions above, people normally differ in what they
perceive as an advantage or disadvantage. Thus, the outcome of the individual
weighing-up of advantages and disadvantages is uncertain. Because of that,
in practice common behaviour expectations and constraints are often used
to control specific behaviour of all road users. For instance general
threats of punishment for violation of rules increases the costs of undesirable
behaviour and therefore suppresses them.
However, people often show reluctance if they are forced to behave in
a way that they do not intend. Thus, the emotional value of the restricted
behaviour (e.g. to drive free of charge downtown) for the people increases,
they seek for loopholes to keep to the behaviour as usual, or they choose
additional, unwanted options such as resistance.
In this regard a change in behaviour is not just to reach through heteronomy
or external pressure (e.g. prices can be perceived as external pressure)
but also - and more considerable - through a change in the individual
attitudes of the affected persons. People must feel that they have a choice,
even if the alternatives are limited and the inputs for their decisions
have changed. If they believe that they are forced to comply they might
show reluctance or they might attempt to change the situation for their
own advantage and restore former perceived leeways. Crucial is the perceived
freedom of choice (Weiner, 1993, 206).
Psychological evaluative research has shown that one single measure on
its own cannot lead to a lasting change in peopleÕs behaviour. To still
be able to influence the behaviour of larger groups of transport users
further important preconditions are to be taken into account.
First it is crucial to clearly define the aims of the measure, i.e. to
define concrete desirable behaviour patterns (e.g. to use a specific mode
of transport, to choose a specific route). Here it is advantageous to
negotiate the aims in co-operation with the persons affected.
Second it is better to systematically build up the desired behaviour rather
than just to respond to the shown target-behaviour (the so-called Ôrepair-principleÕ).
For such a purposeful build-up of specific behaviours the following determinants
must be considered:
(1)
Behaviour supply (e.g. the providing of cars to share, of cycleways etc.),
(2)
Incentives (e.g. the here described prices,
(3)
Attitudes and values (e.g. environmental awareness)
(4/5) Feedback through the personÕs own perception of the behaviour and
its consequences (i.e. not only negative feedback about errors, but also
positive feedback for showing the desired behaviour);
(6) Change in attitudes through increasing the knowledge, for which especially
positive behaviour patterns should be conveyed, and
(7) Attitudes as incentives for the accumulation of knowledge.
Figure
2.2: Model of different behaviour determinants (Fietkau & Kessel, 1981,
p. 10)
|
Behaviour
Supply
|
Attitudes
Value
|
Knowledge
|
| |
(mobility)
behaviour
|
|
|
Incentives
|
|
Perceived
consequences of behaviour
|
Only
combining attitudes, behaviour supply, price incentives, and the visibility
of consequences of oneÕs own behaviour makes a desirable behaviour possible.
Hence, road pricing has to be an integral part of an integrated traffic
demand management approach, which - apart from information campaigns -
also covers supply modifications and legal measures.
2.2
What is the Practical Meaning of Fair Pricing?
To
arrive at the practical meaning of fair pricing, first a brief theoretical
notion of fair pricing is presented, including the EC-policy of fair pricing.
The practical aspects in this paragraph lay in the consequences of these
European notions for cities and how fair pricing works in cities regarding
the aspects linked with fairness: enforcement, exemptions, stakeholders
and transportation of freight.
2.2.1
Brief Theoretical Notions Of Fairness
Pricing
for an individual or institution is considered fairer when:
- Opportunities
offered and type of access provided to an economic process are considered
more equal (procedural notion of fairness). This means for example that
two comparable cities in a country should feel treated the same and
are provided with the same means and constraints by the national governments
when it comes to supplying public transport, building roads or extending
harbours.
- The
equality of the state in which individuals or institutions emerge from
an economic process (end-state fairness). This fairness concept is related
to the Òdifferentiation principleÓ. It consists in judging the results
of the policies by analysing the welfare of the groups lagging behind.
Implementation of the differentiation principle means that the aim is
to improve the situation of groups with the lowest income (e.g. cheaper
tickets for poor people) and of the least best served areas (e.g. improve
public transport in rural areas).
Fairness
is not pure rational and based on arguments only. An individual values
/ perception a situation more fair when:
- The
situation is more consistent with practises of the past to which the
individual has become habituated (Baumol, 1986); an when
- A
good or service X distributed to the individual is considered superior
by this individual in comparison with good or service Y distributed
to another individual.
The
above two notions mean that fairness assumes the existence of asymmetry
of information and that individuals judge regardless of the valuation
of the situation by other parties involved.
2.2.2
EC-Policy: Fair And Efficient Pricing
Within
the policy of the EC, fair and efficient pricing are inseparable from
each other. Fair and efficient pricing in the broadest sense means that
prices reflect costs in order for organisations and citizens to base their
decisions on the right price signals. This means that the interpretation
of the EC on fairness has more to do with a procedural notion of fairness
then an end-state fairness. According to EC principles advanced in its
policy documents end-state fairness is better achieved through the concept
of efficiency, which in turn is made operational through marginal social
cost pricing.
Table
3.2 presents the concepts that are part of the EC-policy and ideas on
fair and efficient pricing and what these concepts mean for cities implementing
projects influencing the fairness of transport pricing, like the PRoGRESS-cities.
Table
2.2: Concepts That Are Part Of The EC-Policy And Their Consequences For
Cities
|
Concepts
that are part of the EC-policy on fair and efficient pricing
|
Consequences
of the concepts for the cities
|
Examples
of implementation the concepts
|
Improve
feeling of fairness for target groups
|
| Charges
are closely and transparently linked with underlying internal costs
(e.g. fuel and vehicle costs) and external costs (e.g. pollution costs,
noise and congestion cost) |
Linking
charges with internal and external costs means that charges will be
highly differentiated regarding for example time (rush hour or not)
and place (bigger cities or rural area) of travelling. |
Choose
a mechanism for pricing instead of taxation. Make a user pay extra
for a new toll road because of the extra service obtained Use tax
to fill a transport fund to improve roads and railways |
Changing
existing taxes to charges. Income deriving from taxes will now directly
be used for transport improvement Inform transport users of the improvements
being made as a result of pricing |
| Charges
should be non-discriminatory across modes and nationals of different
member states. |
This
concept derives from the citizens right to mobility. It does however
not imply a right for free transport but a right to reasonable conditions
of access, quality and price, that is a guarantee of non-exclusion
on economic basis |
Co-ordinating
road pricing projects in cities in several EU-member states (PRoGR_SS)
|
When
introducing pricing measures, relate to other measures in other areas
already existing (museum, disposal of waste etc.) Relate to situations
in other countries of the EU with their disadvantages |
| Revenues
should flow to authorities in countries where the costs are caused. |
With
relevant public transport alternatives available, significant increases
in road user charging could occur |
A
tax on trucks driving through Austria, transporting freight that is
neither loaded in nor destined for Austria. Without the tax Austria
would have the disadvantages of the heavy vehicles without any benefits
|
Make
sure that there are real alternatives to non-minor increases in modal
specific transport prices |
| The
full infrastructure costs should be recovered from transport users
in the long run |
transport
costs = transport benefits |
Infrastructure,
environment, and congestion costs covered by electronic road pricing
and track charges. An insurance system might cover full social costs
and differentiate according to risk. |
It
is long term, make gradual changes and communicate what you are doing
and why |
|