2. SOCIAL ACCEPTANCE

2.1 How to achieve public opinion in favour of road pricing

There are no simple solutions for obtaining acceptability for road pricing measures. However, in terms of public acceptability at least some general rules should be considered in order to make an implementation of a transport pricing measure more likely. (cp. Schlag & Teubel, 1997; Schade, Schlag, et.al., 2000, Schlag & Schade, 2000). These shall be reported in the next section. More specific a communication strategy as one of the main pillars of the introduction procedure has to be designed which ÒsellÒ the measures. In a broader context the whole decision process affects the public opinion. Thus, a tentative process structured into stages which considers acceptability will be reported in section 3.2.4. Finally, one successful introduction of road pricing in the light of "getting the public opinion in favour of road pricing" shall be presented.

2.1.1 General Rules

The objectives of the pricing strategy have to meet main public concerns. Politicians and the public regard traffic problems in cities as a very important and urgent issue. There is a search for solutions. Thus, marginal cost pricing should give rise to environmental benefits and congestion reduction (and these have to be communicated), safety contributions and other advantages should be perceived and it should meet positive social norms (Goodwin, 1989). A number of guidelines to successful implementation can, therefore, be suggested.

  • Pricing strategies have to be perceived as very effective solutions, if not as the only effective solution for the perceived traffic problems. People are used to regard public roads as ÒfreeÒ goods, therefore there will be strong emotional resistance to any attempt to charge for them. If you want people to accept charging for road use or parking there must be very good and convincing reasons. Perhaps the best reason is, that this is the best way of solving perceived urgent problems. The effectiveness of transport pricing may be high but this is not guaranteed and depends on the definition of objectives. The efficiency will be comparatively very high - from the citiesÕ, but not from the motoristsÕ point of view. Thus, not only the objectives of the intended measures must be valued highly by the public, people must also believe that their behaviour contributes to reach these objectives. The values as well as the expectations (the perceived probability to reach these objectives) should be made transparent and first trials of a new behaviour must be successful so that the new behaviour is perceived as effectively contributing to reach the shared values, thus creating positive contingencies between the behaviour and its consequences.
  • Revenues must be hypothecated and alternatives have to be provided. People want to get something for their money. Thus, there must be a package solution, combining traffic restraints and road charging with a set of transport and environmental improvements (cp. Jones, 1998; Schlag & Schade, 2000).
  • Fairness issues have to be considered very carefully. The system must be perceived as fair in particular relating to the personal cost-benefit-relation. The benefits people see for themselves must balance their costs at least in an immaterial way (e.g. by reaching other valuable objectives). In addition people should not feel to be treated unjust in comparison to others. An important role plays in this context the use of the revenues. With the help of the raised charges it is possible to influence the distributional impacts in the desired direction. Hypothecation of the revenues must result in guaranteeing a desired level of mobility for all, even supporting mobility chances for some groups thus meeting equity issues on a population level (Bannister, 1994; Guiliano, 1994; Langmyhr, 1997; Schade et al., 2000)
  • Charging only new facilities can be a rather easy way to introduce road pricing. Using road pricing only for new infrastructure has a better chance of acceptance, as there is a net benefit form the new investment.
  • Public acceptability can only be expected if people have confidence among others in the effectiveness of the measure, the use of the revenues, the fairness and anonymity of the system. One precondition to support confidence is transparency of the intended measures at an early stage. Connected to transparency, for the acceptability of any change you have to create some commitment of people to the new ideas, perhaps creating some identification with the proposed package of measures. This commitment depends on early and credible communication, on positive experiences (at least by models), on the conviction that this is an effective solution, and on perceived chances of participation. People want to see themselves as having at least some degree of control over the things they are affected by. Thus there is a connection between participation, commitment, acceptability and later effectiveness. This points out the importance of early information and participation of people even in concept development. A second precondition for creating confidence is defined responsibility. Who will be responsible for the functioning of the system, for charging and accounting, for revenue allocation, for failures and undesired effects? This has to be defined clearly before implementing the system. Responsibility issues are of particular relevance in connection with the debate of privatisation. And finally, to meet the above requirements it is necessary to design a strategy to communicate the measures.
  • The necessary publicity calls for an intelligent communication strategy.

2.1.2 Some Communication Principles

The communication strategy only works if it covers the whole package. From a psychological point of view a successful communication strategy should - among others - reflect the following principles:

  • All the externalities have to be discussed in advance: creating awareness for the problem, then presenting a package of credible solutions.
  • Positive objectives must be connected with most effective solutions to reach them. Thus transport pricing has to be communicated as a very effective means to reach commonly shared goals. This can make private costs more acceptable.
  • There must be personally positive experiences in first trials changing the transport mode, e.g. time savings, less parking problems, ecological advantages, the possibility to participate in solving traffic problems, attraction of inner-cities etc. Positive experiences on first trials help to get used to the new behaviour. If the first experiences with a newly implemented system have to be positive to hold them, then investments in public transport must go ahead before pricing is introduced to reduce painful first experiences and to have the capacities available.
  • The communication has to point out the positive sides of the package, ie the uses for which the road charges are used. This connection between push and pull - measures (see hypothecation) was not given in a sufficient way in former road pricing strategies (eg in Stuttgart, Germany) or it was not communicated transparently enough. (FAW, 1995).
  • People must feel to have a choice, even if the choice alternatives are restricted and the inputs of their decisions have changed. If they only feel to be forced to compliance, some of them will show reluctance, a strong motive to change the situation for themselves and to restore former perceived possibilities to choose between alternatives. Crucial is the perceived freedom of choice (Weiner, 1993).
  • If you can not convince people, external control to enforce the desired measures has to be very strong. But this external control will only work if a great majority of people generally agree with the measures and accept that people offending against these measures are enforced and punished. This will certainly work if no more than 20 or 30 per cent of all the people targeted oppose the measure. Thus you have to convince a great majority of road users and even of car drivers. The conviction of a great majority is not only a precondition for the acceptance of the measure, but also a precondition for the acceptance of the control against offenders.
  • In addition positive information should be disseminated which corresponds with the desired attitudes and behaviour and negative information for undesired.
  • Achieving changes in normative values is another strong element for establishing the new behaviour. Creating new norms on a collective and new intentions on a personal level may motivate to behave in a new manner to meet these new beliefs. But that must be experienced as valuable in a material and in an immaterial sense. Generally, the perception of the situation has to be changed - and this will influence the behaviour of people.
  • The pricing scheme, and supporting measures must develop a new transport system, offering real alternatives (bus, tram, shared modes of transport), which are well known (information) and attractive in terms of price, convenience, availability and accessibility etc. Constraints to changes in behaviour must be identified and eliminated. Thereby mobility should not been diminished by transport pricing. Such a favourable situation is a precondition to break old habits and to realise new intentions. Thus positive first experiences with alternatives (in mode, time, route choice) can be understood as a learning exercise which demonstrated what can be gained from changed behaviour. In the first instance, positive expectations, positive values and positive outcomes may be partly communicated by models which explain the scheme, and get vicarious rewards (Bandura, 1977).
  • The pricing message has to be communicated by very credible communicators (credible from the point of view of car drivers and other users).

2.1.3 Identification Of Stakeholders

It is important for cities to identify the key stakeholders, and to establish whether or not they support the introduction of pricing. Europrice Technical Paper 3 suggests that the most important stakeholders groups are:

  • public transport,
  • motoring organisation,
  • freight transport industry,
  • cycling and pedestrian organisation,
  • road safety agencies,
  • vehicle manufacturing and service industry,
  • manufacturing,
  • trade unions,
  • environmental organisations,
  • civic societies,
  • interest groups (disabled people, elderly, women),
  • chambers of commerce,
  • health,
  • financial institutions,
  • public services,
  • retail,
  • leisure/tourist organisations,
  • employers; and
  • education establishment

Added to this list, of course, should be the general public. The most supportive groups are likely to be public transport, cycling and pedestrian organisations, environmental organisations and employers. Traditionally, the most non-supportive organisations are: motoring organisations, civic societies, interest groups (unless exempt) and the retail sector. In the UK, however, there is a growing acceptance that increasing congestion is leading to severe delays for drivers, and there is some support for pricing amongst the business community and motoring organisations provide that revenues are clearly ring-fenced to provide improved facilities. Similarly the view was Òno, but it is a necessary evil (Trondheim).Ó The retail sector might be more in favour when toll only has to be paid during rush hour. The chance for success for the urban pricing project will increase if the traffic problem is evident and the stakeholders are aware of this problem. The stakeholders should be involved in planning alternative transport. Road pricing and alternative transport, including improved public transport, should be part of a road pricing package. This package can also compensate groups whose welfare will decrease by the road pricing scheme. The stakeholders should be involved and consulted from the beginning and all the way through the process.

2.1.4 The Process Structured Into Stages

The PRIMA project separates three rather schematic stages of a process aiming at the introduction of a road pricing scheme (Harsman, PŠdam, Wijkmark, 2000, 61-62). The first stage is political and strategic, the second consists of iterative assessments, and the third is oriented towards implementation and monitoring activities.

  • Stage I: This stage starts with the identification and characterisation of a traffic/ transport problem. On this basis a project idea can be formulated by an assigned project management group (project organisation). At the same time the political system has (i) to provide legitimacy to the decision process, (ii) to establish compatibility of views expressed on the local, regional and national levels. At this stage a preliminary feasibility study can be carried out and the major results could be disseminated to the public and discussed in various forms. A final step in the first stage is to identify interest groups and design the decision process accordingly.
  • Stage II: In the second phase a project organisation is formed to (i) make comprehensive assessment studies that generate alternative solutions, (ii) assess the different alternatives, identify potential winners and losers. At this stage it is meaningful to establish an information channel, by which the project organisation can communicate alternatives with the community (voters, stakeholders and other actors). In this context opposing groups may be invited to select an attached committee that can interact with the project organisation. Ideally, this interaction should result in a consensus about the nature of the transport problems and the set of effective (alternative) solutions. Finally, the end result of the second stage is the formulation of a plan for sequential decision-making.
  • Stage III: The third stage may be thought of as the Òimplementation phaseÓ. This requires that the project organisation (project team) reorients itself to carry out the implementation and organise a systematic monitoring of consequences over time. In this stage project-management issues may dominate the process. An important task of the monitoring is to follow the ex post acceptance and to suggest further developments of the introduced system.

2.1.5 One Practical Example:

The Oslo Toll Ring In the mid-eighties, the city of Oslo was confronted with unsatisfactory traffic flow with significant delays for all. Besides, there were local environmental problems with traffic hold ups and pressure on local streets and residential roads. The public funds for road construction were insufficient. To allow the financing of a road investment program, authorities decided to seek the required additional resources from users. The toll ring was to contribute to the implementation of different projects within 15 years, as opposed to 35 years financed by public grants. Through the first part of the eighties there was an excited discussion. Different ways of payment were considered like petrol tax, a local toll ring for the Oslo tunnel, increased parking fees and an area based road tax. Two different motives were proposed:

  • To provide money for constructing roads and other transport infrastructure.
  • To limit car traffic, completely or in rush hours only.

The political process towards implementation was difficult. Four years before the implementation, Oslo City Council and Akershus County Council passed a principle approval about tolls based on motivation 1. Two years later the toll ring passed the formal political approval. Just before that the Norwegian Parliament had changed the law. As a result of this law change, equivalent toll rings were also established in Bergen and Trondheim. After the principal political agreement followed a discussion about localisation. Here one had to combine fairness, maximum of income and practicability (e.g. available land to build toll stations). 210,000 of OsloÕs inhabitants live outside the toll ring. In addition, approximately 200,000 of the regionÕs remaining population frequently go to Oslo city centre. A discussion occurred of who would have to pay and who would not have to pay to go to the city centre. The local majority consisted of the two largest political parties, the social democrats and the conservatives. Certain issues caused strong internal dissension. For example, a considerable group of young people within the labour party demanded that 30% of the revenues were to be allocated to public transport investments. The conservative party considered this breaking the initial agreement. This crisis was solved partly by a warning from the national authorities about a possible termination of national road and railway investments.

Two different factors made the agreement possible at last:

  • Opposite regards gave the same substantial solution. The supporters of road construction were satisfied by the official arguments, while those against road construction wanted the toll ring because it would make an opportunity to limit the number of cars into the city when it was established.
  • Local disagreement checked by public financial pressure. Fear of losing national grants made municipal politicians willing to make a compromise.

2.1.6 Public Acceptability Of Tolls

Norway has a long tradition of using road tolls as a way of financing road investments. It is politically accepted in all parties. Before the extensive toll systems were implemented in the cities, there were tolls on bridges and tunnels connecting the islands to the mainland. There is no general acceptability of road pricing as a demand management measure. In general it has to be noted that attitudes before the implementation of the toll ring are based more on expectations and estimations rather than on real experiences with the system ('acceptability'). In contrast to the cross-sectioned stated acceptability the revealed behaviour after the introduction of the system ('acceptance') can be seen as a process of dealing with the adaptation to the new mobility situation. In the year before the implementation of the toll ring, 70% of the cityÕs population were negative towards the toll ring (see Figure 2.1). When the system had been operative for one year this opposition had been reduced to 64%. In 1998 this figure was 54%. The share being very negative has decreased from 40 to 17 percent during the same period. The share being positive to the toll system has steadily increased during the period, from 30 percent before the toll system opened to 46 percent in 1998.

Figure 2.1: Development Of Attitudes Towards The Oslo Toll Ring (Norwegian Public Roads Administration Et Al. 1999, 9)

The data show that public acceptance increases with successful implementation, thus showing, that it is possible to raise acceptance by implementing a carefully selected road pricing scheme.

2.1.7 Influencing Public Behaviour

Before introducing road pricing measures, alternative mobility-opportunities or modes of transport have to be provided. These alternative modes of transport must already be available, attractive and well-known so that new mobility behaviour is a positive experience, which - in turn - is most important when the road users change the mode of transport for the very first time. Of further importance is that behaviour can be shown in accordance with specific intentions and that the personal benefits of the behaviour outweigh its costs. In such way new habits, together with new normative behaviour expectations, can develop.
When considering the road users' cost-benefit-calculations it is usually assumed that road users always calculate in a rational way, i.e. that before deciding for a specific behaviour they weigh up its advantages and disadvantages, and this also in comparison to other possible behaviours. So for a modification of the road usersÕ cost-benefit-calculations in order to influence behaviour there are four different options (see Table 3.1):

  1. to decrease the expected benefits of a undesired behaviour (e.g. restrict parking);
  2. to decrease the expected costs of the desired behaviour (e.g. reduced prices of public transport, stations which are easy to reach etc.);
  3. to increase the expected benefits of the desired behaviour (e.g. bonus for less vehicle km)
  4. to increase the expected costs of the undesired behaviour (e.g. road charges)

Table 2.1: The Variation Of The Road Users' Cost-Benefit-Calculation

 
Benefits
Costs
Undesired behaviour
1
4
Desired behaviour
3
2

 

But, in contrast to the assumptions above, people normally differ in what they perceive as an advantage or disadvantage. Thus, the outcome of the individual weighing-up of advantages and disadvantages is uncertain. Because of that, in practice common behaviour expectations and constraints are often used to control specific behaviour of all road users. For instance general threats of punishment for violation of rules increases the costs of undesirable behaviour and therefore suppresses them.
However, people often show reluctance if they are forced to behave in a way that they do not intend. Thus, the emotional value of the restricted behaviour (e.g. to drive free of charge downtown) for the people increases, they seek for loopholes to keep to the behaviour as usual, or they choose additional, unwanted options such as resistance.
In this regard a change in behaviour is not just to reach through heteronomy or external pressure (e.g. prices can be perceived as external pressure) but also - and more considerable - through a change in the individual attitudes of the affected persons. People must feel that they have a choice, even if the alternatives are limited and the inputs for their decisions have changed. If they believe that they are forced to comply they might show reluctance or they might attempt to change the situation for their own advantage and restore former perceived leeways. Crucial is the perceived freedom of choice (Weiner, 1993, 206).
Psychological evaluative research has shown that one single measure on its own cannot lead to a lasting change in peopleÕs behaviour. To still be able to influence the behaviour of larger groups of transport users further important preconditions are to be taken into account.
First it is crucial to clearly define the aims of the measure, i.e. to define concrete desirable behaviour patterns (e.g. to use a specific mode of transport, to choose a specific route). Here it is advantageous to negotiate the aims in co-operation with the persons affected.
Second it is better to systematically build up the desired behaviour rather than just to respond to the shown target-behaviour (the so-called Ôrepair-principleÕ). For such a purposeful build-up of specific behaviours the following determinants must be considered:

(1) Behaviour supply (e.g. the providing of cars to share, of cycleways etc.),
(2) Incentives (e.g. the here described prices,
(3) Attitudes and values (e.g. environmental awareness)
(4/5) Feedback through the personÕs own perception of the behaviour and its consequences (i.e. not only negative feedback about errors, but also positive feedback for showing the desired behaviour);
(6) Change in attitudes through increasing the knowledge, for which especially positive behaviour patterns should be conveyed, and
(7) Attitudes as incentives for the accumulation of knowledge.

Figure 2.2: Model of different behaviour determinants (Fietkau & Kessel, 1981, p. 10)

Behaviour Supply
Attitudes Value
Knowledge
 
(mobility) behaviour
 
Incentives
 
Perceived consequences of behaviour

Only combining attitudes, behaviour supply, price incentives, and the visibility of consequences of oneÕs own behaviour makes a desirable behaviour possible. Hence, road pricing has to be an integral part of an integrated traffic demand management approach, which - apart from information campaigns - also covers supply modifications and legal measures.

2.2 What is the Practical Meaning of Fair Pricing?

To arrive at the practical meaning of fair pricing, first a brief theoretical notion of fair pricing is presented, including the EC-policy of fair pricing. The practical aspects in this paragraph lay in the consequences of these European notions for cities and how fair pricing works in cities regarding the aspects linked with fairness: enforcement, exemptions, stakeholders and transportation of freight.

2.2.1 Brief Theoretical Notions Of Fairness

Pricing for an individual or institution is considered fairer when:

  • Opportunities offered and type of access provided to an economic process are considered more equal (procedural notion of fairness). This means for example that two comparable cities in a country should feel treated the same and are provided with the same means and constraints by the national governments when it comes to supplying public transport, building roads or extending harbours.
  • The equality of the state in which individuals or institutions emerge from an economic process (end-state fairness). This fairness concept is related to the Òdifferentiation principleÓ. It consists in judging the results of the policies by analysing the welfare of the groups lagging behind. Implementation of the differentiation principle means that the aim is to improve the situation of groups with the lowest income (e.g. cheaper tickets for poor people) and of the least best served areas (e.g. improve public transport in rural areas).

Fairness is not pure rational and based on arguments only. An individual values / perception a situation more fair when:

  • The situation is more consistent with practises of the past to which the individual has become habituated (Baumol, 1986); an when
  • A good or service X distributed to the individual is considered superior by this individual in comparison with good or service Y distributed to another individual.

The above two notions mean that fairness assumes the existence of asymmetry of information and that individuals judge regardless of the valuation of the situation by other parties involved.

2.2.2 EC-Policy: Fair And Efficient Pricing

Within the policy of the EC, fair and efficient pricing are inseparable from each other. Fair and efficient pricing in the broadest sense means that prices reflect costs in order for organisations and citizens to base their decisions on the right price signals. This means that the interpretation of the EC on fairness has more to do with a procedural notion of fairness then an end-state fairness. According to EC principles advanced in its policy documents end-state fairness is better achieved through the concept of efficiency, which in turn is made operational through marginal social cost pricing.
Table 3.2 presents the concepts that are part of the EC-policy and ideas on fair and efficient pricing and what these concepts mean for cities implementing projects influencing the fairness of transport pricing, like the PRoGRESS-cities.

Table 2.2: Concepts That Are Part Of The EC-Policy And Their Consequences For Cities

Concepts that are part of the EC-policy on fair and efficient pricing
Consequences of the concepts for the cities
Examples of implementation the concepts
Improve feeling of fairness for target groups
Charges are closely and transparently linked with underlying internal costs (e.g. fuel and vehicle costs) and external costs (e.g. pollution costs, noise and congestion cost) Linking charges with internal and external costs means that charges will be highly differentiated regarding for example time (rush hour or not) and place (bigger cities or rural area) of travelling. Choose a mechanism for pricing instead of taxation. Make a user pay extra for a new toll road because of the extra service obtained Use tax to fill a transport fund to improve roads and railways Changing existing taxes to charges. Income deriving from taxes will now directly be used for transport improvement Inform transport users of the improvements being made as a result of pricing
Charges should be non-discriminatory across modes and nationals of different member states. This concept derives from the citizens right to mobility. It does however not imply a right for free transport but a right to reasonable conditions of access, quality and price, that is a guarantee of non-exclusion on economic basis Co-ordinating road pricing projects in cities in several EU-member states (PRoGR_SS) When introducing pricing measures, relate to other measures in other areas already existing (museum, disposal of waste etc.) Relate to situations in other countries of the EU with their disadvantages
Revenues should flow to authorities in countries where the costs are caused. With relevant public transport alternatives available, significant increases in road user charging could occur A tax on trucks driving through Austria, transporting freight that is neither loaded in nor destined for Austria. Without the tax Austria would have the disadvantages of the heavy vehicles without any benefits Make sure that there are real alternatives to non-minor increases in modal specific transport prices
The full infrastructure costs should be recovered from transport users in the long run transport costs = transport benefits Infrastructure, environment, and congestion costs covered by electronic road pricing and track charges. An insurance system might cover full social costs and differentiate according to risk. It is long term, make gradual changes and communicate what you are doing and why