3. FINANCE, LEGAL AND IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES

3.1 How to Finance Set-up Costs?

The cost of establishing a road user charging scheme is likely to be considerable. Not only are there the physical costs of the necessary infrastructure and personnel, but there will be a variety of lead-in costs whilst the scheme is developed, such as public consultation, media campaigns, and legal/planning costs.
If a road user charging scheme is implemented wholly within the public sector, there is a potential problem of timing. While road user charging should be expected to generate substantial levels of net revenue which can be used eventually to finance additional transport improvements, there will of course be no revenue generated until the road user charging scheme is in place. In some EC member states, public investment in transport is substantial, and the public sector can drive road user charging forward without subsidy. In other states, notably the UK, public subsidy has been driven down in order to reduce personal taxation, and alternative finance sources are likely to be needed.
This is one of the main reasons why it might be attractive to seek the participation of the private sector in establishing a road user charging scheme. Public-private partnership (PPP), could provide for Õup-frontÕ investment to enable other transport improvements to be in place before the imposition of road user charging charges. PPP could be used as the mechanism for procurement of the scheme, as an alternative to more conventional public sector purchasing.
If this approach is preferred, then it is essential therefore that the legal and institutional framework in member states allows for such private sector involvement in the planning of transport schemes. Of course, given the sensitivity of the issue, the relevant local authorities will wish remain in close control of any scheme, and private sector input should be closely regulated.
Moreover, it should be noted that in the UK, where the PPP approach has become commonplace, there are concerns that the private sector is only willing to finance projects where a significant profit can be achieved. The private sector is often highly risk averse, and demands a rate of return well in excess of that required to justify public investment. Whilst local authorities are restricted in their ability to invest, they should be aware that high levels of private investment will require a high rate of return which may absorb a significant proportion of future revenues. Private sector investment, therefore, represents a valuable source of additional finance, but is less economically advisable where a publicly funded approach can be adopted. A gradual implementation of road pricing which develops a revenue stream from a low charge level in early years may help to reduce dependency on private sector investment.

The various approaches to scheme funding which might be explored are described as follows:

  • Full Public Private Partnership: the local authority may wish to establish a separate entity jointly with the private sector, which is able to implement the road pricing scheme, and develop complementary measures such as public transport schemes. This type of scheme, where the private sector takes a substantial level of control over the scheme may represent a longer term solution, but is unlikely to be acceptable socially until the concept of road pricing is better established. A further concern would be that any private sector partner would, presumably, benefit from tolls collected and, therefore, might wish to promote the use of the private car to maximise revenues, or to take control of decisions such as tolling structures.
  • Partial Public Private Partnership: a more acceptable approach would involve the local authority administering a scheme, but enabling the private sector to invest in selected elements of the scheme whilst benefiting from revenues raised. For example, the road pricing scheme might be privately developed, but leased to the local authority at a fixed rate, whilst the revenues achieved would be dedicated to lease costs and subsidies for a private public transport system. The disadvantage of this is that the private sector will be less likely to accept risk transfer where it has less control over the revenue stream.
  • Privately financed publicly operated scheme: a more conventional approach would see the local authority develop the scheme on its own initiative, but raising private finance to support identified elements of the overall scheme such as the road pricing system and the public transport scheme which might be delivered by different contractors. Once again, care would have to be taken to ensure that private sector partners would not be encouraged to promote car travel, but that toll revenues would go directly to the local authority.
  • Public sector investment: a viable road pricing scheme will incur significant start-up costs before it becomes viable. Only when these costs are met will any operating surplus be released to support infrastructure investment. A publicly funded approach, without additional up-front funding, might be applicable in a city like Singapore, but is less appropriate in a major European city where road pricing will need to be underpinned by immediate investment in transport infrastructure, unless significant additional funding sources are available. The only way in which this approach could be viable would be to introduce a low level fee to raise revenues to develop infrastructure and to increase fees to a level capable of demand management once such infrastructure is in place.

In the past, PPP schemes have generally been related to a comparatively simple project such as a single closed system. Whilst it is understandable that local authorities will wish to seek private investment to fund the public transport schemes which are required to enable pricing to be deemed acceptable, further research and demonstration work will be required to determine which models are most suitable.

3.2 How To Overcome Legal and Institutional Framework Barriers?

The legal barriers to urban road user charging in the majority of EC member states are quite specific. Whilst the collection of tolls on designated highways is legal in most states (although practised to a varying degree), charging within the urban are is generally not legal. It is difficult for the individual city to achieve a change in this situation alone. The Europrice political initiative is one which has assembled a group of cities, sympathetic to the principle of road pricing, to provide a focus for city/regional issues to be debated. It is likely that pan-European initiatives of this kind will help to convince member states that the primary legislation which is required to enable road use charging should be implemented.
Within the UK, the Transport Bill, which was introduced to the House of Commons in 1999, will provide the required legislation. In Rome, the Road code authorises local authorities to introduce road pricing to preserve the environment of historic cities. States such as Denmark, France and the Netherlands are currently appraising the options.

Once the primary legislation is in place, authorities will need to give consideration to a number of secondary issues:

  • Access control systems must be implemented in a manner which is consistent with existing legislation.
  • Enforcement systems must be designed not to infringe concerns over data protection and civil liberties. For this reason, a paper based system which avoids issues such as vehicle recognition, may provide a short-term solution.
  • Once powers to collect charges are in place, a commitment to the hypothecation of revenues to transport investment may be required in order to ensure that the scheme is deemed to be acceptable.

Institutional barriers are likely to vary greatly between member states. The key issue to consider is the importance of ensuring a broad base of support for any scheme at the outset. This can only achieved by a process of consensus building whereby the proposals are supported by the key actors and by the public. Success will depend greatly on the existing structures within the area. It is likely that a series of key actors will need to co-operate effectively. These may include (Table 4.1).

Table 3.1: Key Operators and their Significance Institution Significance

Institution Significance
National Government Prepare primary legislation to enable pricing
Regional Government Prepare regional policy to permit pricing
Local Government Prepare and plan scheme and raise and administer finance
Transport Authority Planning of services to enable access to areas affected by pricing
Planning Authority Development of land-use planning approach to reinforce pricing
Transport Operators Provision of services to enable access to areas affected by pricing
Emergency Services Development of procedures to ensure that pricing infrastructure does not impede access

This list is not exhaustive, and will take a different form in every urban area. The important lesson is to ensure that at the outset all actors are identified, and that a forum for effective communication is established. This may require moderation by a neutral expert such as a local academic or consultant, and should be established well in advance of the development of any scheme. The purpose of the forum is to ensure that all potential barriers are identified and resolved in good time. Where significant financial investment of participatory processes must be undertaken in order to overcome such barriers, the partners should be all kept well informed of the processes to be completed in order to distinguish between complex problems which are being addressed, and problems which may be outstanding.
Road pricing is likely to be most easily implemented in a city in which planning and transport powers are vested in a single authority. This is a barrier which may be difficult to overcome where it exists. If powers are held by a variety of authorities, a formal partnership may be needed to implement road pricing in a co-ordinated manner.
Pricing is most commonly seen as a solution for large urban areas. This can pose a severe problem when the area comprises a series of individual local authorities. These authorities may be autonomous, and may have very different policy approaches. In such an instance, it may be preferable for the lead to be taken by a regional or sub-regional authority which has over-arching responsibilities in order to seek to incorporate objectively the views of each smaller area. Scheme promoters must be aware that in such cases the risk of withdrawal of a single partner can leave a gap in a cordon or area-based charging scheme, rendering the scheme impractical. Urban agglomerations are, therefore, particularly vulnerable to political change.
An example is the experience of London. Following the abolition in 1986 of the Greater London Council, transport issues have been addressed by individual Borough Councils. Whilst these co-operate on many practical issues, consensus building in support of transport is very difficult to achieve. The election in 2000 of a single Mayor for London and the creation of the Greater London Authority and Transport for London has helped to overcome these barriers by providing a single decision-making body.
An example of a barrier which still prevails in the UK is the deregulation of public transport provision outside London. Since local authorities have very limited influence over services and fares, it is exceedingly difficult to ensure that adequate services will be in place to provide a suitable alternative to car usage after pricing is introduced. Local authorities can invest in physical infrastructure such as LRT systems, but are less able to develop bus networks, other than by entering into quality partnerships with co-operative operators.
The following guidance on successful implementation was prepared for the Final Report of the CAPTURE project (Table 4.2).

Table 3.2: Guidance on Successful Overcoming Institutional Barriers

One of the major findings of the CAPTURE project was that what is planned is often not implemented. This seems like a very obvious statement, but in most monitoring and research only that which is implemented is studied and that which is not is ignored. In CAPTURE a decision was taken to accept that some elements (or entire plans) were not being implemented and look for the reasons why, and suggest ways in which mistakes could be lessened in the future. The basic steps in design should include:

  • Gaining consensus for the need for change - There is a need for consultation and participation by key actors, and the public. In general this stage may be relatively easy, but it is important that all bodies involved in decision making understand to goals of projects such as to effect a modal shift
  • Gaining consensus over methods for solving agreed ÔproblemsÕ - this stage is more complex. While there is a general consensus that it Òwould be a good thingÓ to reduce dependence on the car and to encourage people to use other modes, there may be widely differing views about how to achieve that goal. It is at this stage that consultation with the public is of utmost importance, in order to educate those affected both in terms of what the schemes will actually involve, and how they are designed to improve conditions. It is important that such consultation is done at an early stage so that suggestions from local people can be incorporated (and with very local knowledge they may be better solutions than local authorities or outside consultants can provide), and that the consultation does not just result in hostility to a scheme that has become imprinted as the only solution to those proposing it.
  • Adopting a plan with a Ôlogically arguable likelihoodÕ of success - It is often apparent (particularly in hindsight) that many schemes put forward and put into action were never likely to succeed in the goals they set out to achieve. Any scheme which gets as far as being formally proposed should be capable of withstanding critical analysis of its likely success in achieving its goals if it is implemented.
  • Consideration of the likelihood of adoption - While the actual conditions which determine whether or not a scheme will see its way to completion are complex it is apparent that some sort of local assessment of the likelihood of adoption should be made. Learning from past mistakes, delays, and suchlike is crucial, and in general, assessments of these kinds will be made, but with the belief that Òthings will be different this timeÓ. Of course some measures may be essential to a strategy but will be described as having a very low likelihood of success. Perhaps some of the more controversial elements should be piloted in areas where they are likely to be implemented in order to give them a higher chance of success elsewhere.
  • Ensurance that overall goals are not prejudiced by possible or likely changes to detail - contingency plan - an example of this problem on a large scale is the Sheffield Supertram system in the UK which was originally designed in a planned public transport system to act as the ÔbackboneÕ to the system. But after the design stage the UK government brought in its deregulation of the bus industry which meant that the system was in competition (on price and service levels) with bus services which, from many key locations were able to access the city centre much faster and more cheaply.
  • Cohesive management of plans - it is important that plans are constantly overseen towards their conclusion. If key personnel change more than is absolutely necessary some key understandings of the project will be lost.

It could be said that it is impossible to decide how to proceed from where we are without agreeing on the goal, and certainly in many senses, this is true. Clear direction and strategy can only be created by actors who are clear and have a common understanding about the end goal. It is this lack of a common vision concerning an end state for transport policy which has been responsible for the lack of progress towards a sensible transport strategy. It is also true that if direction is agreed, then strategies can be defined, and it is here that there is more scope for consensus.

4. ASSESMENT OF ROADPRICING

4.1 Why Pricing Should be Considered

4.1.1 Why Reduce Car Usage?

Car ownership and car usage have increased, and continue to increase significantly across almost all European cities. The need for efficient transport systems and personal mobility is recognised as a vital element of modern day life. Increasingly, however, people are becoming concerned about the impact of these transport systems upon their health, their safety, the local environment, and the global environment. In addition, traffic congestion has a major economic impact, accounting for some 2% of the gross domestic product (GDP) of the European Union (EU) every year.

The environmental problem can be summarised as follows:

  • The transport sector is responsible for one third of European energy consumption, and its share is increasing
  • Increasing energy demand in the transport sector is almost entirely due to the growth in road traffic, particularly the use of the private car.
  • The energy consumed in transport is supplied almost exclusively by oil products
  • The burning of oil products is responsible for the emission of large quantities of pollutants that are harmful to human health, and contribute significantly to global warming
  • During the last 15 years, the energy consumed by urban transport has increased four times more quickly than for inter-urban transport

Research has suggested that it is possible to increase the use of public transport significantly, thereby reducing private vehicle traffic, by implementing integrated packages of measures designed to improve service quality and performance. Even greater reductions in energy and emissions could be achieved if private car traffic is restrained by either physical or fiscal measures.

4.1.2 The Role of Pricing as a Means to Reduce Car Usage

Charging is not the solution of our traffic problems. It is not even a solution, but may form a key part of an integrated strategy, which consists of different instruments. There is neither a ready-made solution, nor the one solution, but there are different options, discussed in section 2.2, which may be implemented depending on given situations and general conditions. Nevertheless; incentives can contribute to an efficient solution of the existing problems, if they are applied meaningful and in combination with further measures. To limit the negative consequences of urban traffic (e.g. heavy congestion, air pollution, environmental damage, noise etc.) first of all technique-based modifications on the supply side were used.

For instance:

  • reduction of vehicles' energy consumption;
  • reduction of emissions produced by vehicles;
  • improvements in safety of cars and roads;
  • telematic applications which improve the effectiveness of traffic etc.

Whilst these technological options reduce the negative impacts of traffic (growth) to some extent, they can not eliminate it completely. Therefore increasingly behaviour-influencing measures on the demand side, are being discussed (OECD, 1997).

An alternative definition of the ways in the impact of car usage can be reduced, these are commonly called Ôthe three EÕsÕ (Schlag, 1998), is described below:

  • Enforcement: legal measures, mainly rules and bans, as behaviour-influencing preconditions for a guarantee of a safe traffic and transport;
  • Engineering: an altered arrangement of supply, affecting the routes for the different means of transport as well as the means of transport themselves;
  • Education: measures of education, instruction and information of - first and foremost - the vehicle drivers.

As a further possibility for influencing mobility, a fourth ÔEÕ is to be considered: fiscal incentives, such as road user fees named ÔEncouragementÕ or ÔEconomyÕ. Within other areas, e.g. telecommunications or energy use (Bell et al., 1996), pricing systems have proved to be very effective control means.
Transport policies have in the past focused largely on direct regulation (enforcement). Whilst rules have brought significant improvements in some areas (e.g. safety), they have not been able to unlock the full potential of response options that can be triggered through price signals. Price based policies give citizens and businesses incentives to find solutions for certain problems. The objective of ensuring sustainable transport requires that prices reflect underlying scarcities which otherwise would not be taken into account sufficiently. Decisions made by individuals with respect to their choice of mode, their location and investments are at least partly based on prices. So prices have to be reasonable to improve transport.

In general the following fiscal elements can be identified within the cost of mobility (cp. Schlag, 1998, 309):

  • Capital and vehicle taxes - purchase and saleÕs taxes, value-added tax (VAT), motorcar tax (annual), costs of the acquisition of the driving licence.
  • indirect running taxes, which enable the access to the use of a road space and which are not to be paid in direct connection with the traffic behaviour. E.g. fuel tax, resident parking fees, monthly ticket for public transport, motorway fees (for goods- and passenger-transport) cordon tolls, road and bridge tolls - as long as not referred to single passages or drives (monthly tickets etc.)
  • direct taxes (referred to use), which are limited to the individual range of use (spatial and/or temporal). E.g. taxi costs, parking fees (per time of use), ticket for public transport (per trip), weight-distance-fees for lorries and busses, cordon tolls, road and bridge tolls - referred to single passages and drives, automatically measured road using fees.

4.1.3 Effectiveness of Pricing Measures to Reduce Car Usage

In order to influence mobility behaviour, direct user fees like road pricing which have to be paid in connection with the personal road use are particularly effective. In general the influence of price incentives may refer to different levels of the decision hierarchy of road users. Rothengatter (1994) mentions a multiplicity of decision levels, which can reach from impacts on route choice, travel time, journey frequencies, driving widths and impacts on modal split and vehicle selection up to a modification of residence choice. More specifically, the various behavioural dimensions determining external costs (and thus problems) in urban transport would be optimally affected by theoretical (and so-called) "first-best" pricing measures, if only such measures were possible and applicable. However, on the basis of at present available pricing measures it is difficult to distinguish between types of infrastructure users and categories of external costs the users generate. Thus, the measures up to date can only be called "second-best" measures as they only partially lead to the behavioural responses which would be elicited by "first-best" measures. Table 5.1 shows to which extent some possible second-best instruments allow for differentiation between important behavioural dimensions. A distinction is made between an unlikely direct impact, a possible direct impact, a likely direct impact (possibly approaching first-best standards), and finally the first-best bench-mark.

Table 4.1: Dependence of various behavioural dimensions on various pricing instruments (Milne et al., 1999, p. 66).

 

Car use

Car ownership

Spatial behaviourb

Vehicle kilometres

Number
of trips

Time
of driving (peak or off-peak)

Place of driving (area or route)

Driving style

Fleet

Sizea

Vehicle technology

First-best bench-mark

***

***

***

***

***

***

***

***

Second-best direct demand management

ERP per km

Parking fees

Toll booths

ERP Cordon

Peak permits

Area licences

Fuel taxes

 

**

*

*

*

*

*

**

 

**

**

**

**

*

*

**

 

**

-

*

**

*

*

-

 

*

*/-

*

*

*

*

-

 

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

 

**

*

**

**

**

**

**

 

-

-

-

-

-

*

**

 

**

*

*

*

*/-

**

**

Indirect demand management

Vehicle taxes

Subsidising public transport

Subsidising tele-working

Location subsidies/taxes

*

*

*

*

*

*

**

-

-

-

*

-

-

*/-

*/-

*/-

-

-

-

-

**

*

*

-

see#

-

-

-

-

*

-

*

Supply-side oriented policies

Differentiated vehicle taxes

Differentiated fuel taxes

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

**#

**

-

-

 

***optimal (first-best) impact
** likely direct impact, possibly approaching first-best standards
* possible direct impact
Ð no particularly strong direct impact, or at least unlikely in practice
a Also allows for car size.
b Location of residence vs. work and leisure activities. Second-best pricing measures with their imperfect power to differentiate cannot provide perfect incentives for infrastructure users in relation to the external costs they are generating. Also, there is no reason to believe that such measures would be sufficient to secure optimality of long-run developments in mobility behaviour. Therefore, besides second-best pricing, there may be a need for complementary policies to affect long-run decisions concerning the factors behind the long-run position and shape of the relevant demand in a socially desirable manner.

4.2 What is the impact of charging on traffic and the economy?

4.2.1 Traffic Flows

Operational benefits from changes in traffic flows result primarily from the improvement in road operating conditions when users divert to other forms of transport or to other periods. Reduced vehicle kilometres will also result in accident benefits, although these may be offset by increases in vehicle speeds due to a reduction in congestion.
Additional benefits will be achieved due to reduced environmental impacts including air quality and noise, as well as an improvement in the urban environment.
Pricing schemes can achieve significant reductions in traffic flows as identified in the following examples:

Examples of reduction is traffic due to pricing

The Singapore ERP system Ð the most complete and relevant example of Road User Charging - has expressway gantries which operate during the morning rush hours from 7.30 am to 9.30 am from Mondays to Fridays in the direction of flow to the city. Traffic volumes during the ERP period have dropped by about 15%. There is a slight spreading of the peak hour traffic as some vehicles take advantage of the lower charges between 7.30 am Ð 8.00 am and 9.00 am Ð 9.30 am. Weekday charges vary from route to route depending on the time of day. These benefits have been achieved in addition to the impact of the original Singapore Area charging scheme which saw a 50% reduction in AM peak flows with an 83% increase in bus patronage from 1975 to 1992.

Reductions in traffic flow in Trondheim were substantially lower in the order of 5-7%, but these were based upon tolls set to raise revenues rather than to control car usage. Higher tolls were trialled during the CONCERT project, achieving reductions of 10-17%. The use of varying tolls for different vehicles classes, or for setting lower tolls for a high occupancy vehicle lane may enable the system to further optimise conditions for selected classes of road user.

4.2.2 Economic Benefits

The economic benefits of road pricing will vary in accordance with the approach taken to scheme design. A scheme is likely to seek to achieve one or more of the following objectives:

  • To raise revenues
  • To deter the use of the private car
  • To ensure that travellers meet the true cost of their journey in an equitable manner

Each of these objectives will lead to economic benefits either directly, through gaining revenue, or indirectly, through improvements to the economy achieved by reducing congestion.
The CUPID Consortium is in the process if identifying the full range of economic impacts of pricing schemes as part of the development of Deliverable 4, Evaluation Framework. Table 7 provides a breakdown of key economic indicators.
Some of these indicators, such as revenues raised, can be readily expressed as financial values. Others, such as the impact on employment, are less tangible.
Beyond this table lies the full range of socio-economic, environmental and other impacts, many of which are complex to identify in monetary terms, but which make up the wider impact of pricing. The identification and appraisal of these impacts will be a central element in the work of CUPID over the coming years.

Table 4.2: Provisional List of Economic Indicators

Economic Direct financial Investment cost
Support infrastructure cost
Level of initial external investment
Labour cost
Maintenance cost
Level of ongoing public subsidy needed
Operating revenues
Profitability
  Employment Temporary jobs provided by installation of demonstration
Long-term jobs provided by operation of demonstration
Indirect, long-term jobs
  Regional development Long term impact of measure on economy
Regional access issues
Change in conditions for shopping
Change in conditions for tourism
Vitality
Overall trade

 

The use of road pricing to reduce congestion can offer great benefits both through direct costs and indirect costs both to businesses and residents. The direct reduction in time spent in delays will have a knock-on effect on business efficiency and consumer pricing whilst the improved environment will provide a healthier, more attractive, city, which is likely to help to encourage inward investment. The OECD estimated that 4.1% of GDP was lost to transport externalities in 1994: road pricing may help to reduce this figure.
A longer term social objective, proposed in the White Paper on Fair and Efficient Pricing, is to ensure that all travellers meet the full cost to society of their journeys. For example, in the UK, motorway carry 17% of all vehicle kilometres, but the cost of motorway congestion is only 1% of the total. Conversely, the 1% of vehicle kilometres represented by urban centre peak hour traffic, are responsible for 13% of all congestion costs. Existing fiscal measures such as fuel and vehicles taxation do not reflect these differences. Road User Charging can ensure that travel choices reflect the real cost of travel, rather than perceived cost in order to encourage economically efficient behaviour.
The economic benefits to society can be maximised by developing varying tolls which favour essential road users such as public transport, freight or high occupancy vehicles.

4.2.3 Assessment of Potential Benefits

Extensive work has been undertaken to assess the potential benefits of pricing. In the UK, studies and trials of road pricing have been undertaken in Bristol, Leicester and London. The Bristol ELGAR trials, part of the CONCERT project, and the LERTS system in Leicester included real-life trials of modal choice amongst travellers offered the option between the use of the private car and bus-based park and ride. Complementary measures such as variable message sign information on environmental conditions and sliding scales for tolls have been considered. Progress in the UK is now delayed, awaiting the introduction of powers to enable the collection of area tolls, and to permit hypothecation, the direct allocation of funds from tolls to transport infrastructure.
These trials, and an ongoing trial in Bristol for the INTERCEPT project, provide an insight into the public reaction to pricing, but do not enable the longer-term impacts to be assessed. Major decisions, such as whether or not to replace a car, may only be made on a cycle of 3-5 years or even more, and so it is only be means of true demonstration that an accurate long-run assessment of impact can be provided.
Extensive analysis of the impact of pricing has also been undertaken by means of the use of transport models. The advantage of this approach is that the model provides a desk-top assessment on impacts. In some ways this is very helpful as data such as the potential revenues can be identified and used to determine the wider infrastructure measures which might be implemented. Models also provide a first estimate of the charge levels which might be required in order to achieve a specific change in behaviour. A comprehensive review of these issues can be found in the EC supported TASTe Guidelines on the Use of Tools for Assessing Traffic Demand Management Strategies.

4.3 How to Use Road Capacity and Revenues Obtained by Implementing Road Pricing

4.3.1 Use of Road Capacity

There are two approaches to the use of road capacity obtained by implementing road pricing. One option is that the road network can be reduced in scale to reflect the reduction in traffic due to road pricing. The road space released may be allocated to public transport as a dedicated corridor, reserved for high occupancy vehicles, or reserved for non-motorised modes or transport. Alternatively the space may be developed either for environmental improvements, or to support local economic activity. This is a highly idealised solution. In reality, road pricing schemes are likely only to address the most severe impacts on congestion in city centres. Therefore any reduction in traffic will help to reduce congestion in the short to medium term, but will not necessarily enable the reduction in highway capacity. The key benefit of road pricing to the business sector is that it enables efficient access for goods and people, and measures to reduce such access are likely to result in a loss of support from this sector.
This approach has been adopted in Singapore where restrictions of vehicle access have been accompanied by the continuing development of high quality public transport alternatives.
The alternative, therefore, is that the spare road capacity is used to improve traffic conditions. The improvements will help to limit the economic impacts of congestion, whilst they will also achieve environmental benefits by reducing the impacts of congestion on air quality. This is the approach which is currently seen in Europe, both in the pricing systems in Norway, as well as the use of road tolls in France and elsewhere.

4.3.2 Use of Revenues

The revenues from congestion charging may be used in three ways:

  • They can remain within the road transport sector and therefore benefit those who pay them: this will reduce congestion but not control car usage
  • revenues could be used for financing other parts of a comprehensive strategy to deal with congestion (e.g. route guidance systems, public transport etc,).
  • Alternatively, these revenues would allow other taxes which are currently used for the public financing of infrastructure but which are largely unrelated to the costs of infrastructure use to be allocated to other purposes, or to be cut.

In the long run, congestion charging holds out the prospect of reforming transport taxation in a manner that would greatly increase the efficiency and equity of our transport system.
It could be argued that a congestion charging scheme which subsidises new roads, and thereby attracts more users is actually failing to resolve the problems it is intended to address. On the other hand, in many cities, road pricing is intended to do exactly that. If the Road User Charging scheme too attractive to a motorist, he or she will not consider the public transport alternative unless more road space is re-allocated to rapid transit systems. Segregating public transport routes from other road traffic will increase efficiency by reducing delays caused by congestion. If this increased efficiency is visible to motorists and is a result of road space being taken away from them, they are more likely to think about using public transport.
Visible hypothecation of Road User Charging revenues to public transport alternatives is vital to combat public opposition to congestion charging schemes. Revenues may be used to improve or introduce modal interchange facilities, for example park and ride facilities located on the periphery of the charged area would provide an alternative means of access. The increased volume parking and interchange activity to be expected at such interchange points needs to be estimated and accommodate in a safe and efficient manner.
Responses to the 1997 consultation in the UK on developing an integrated transport policy indicated a very strong feeling that if Road User Charging was to be introduced, the net revenue should be retained by local authorities and spent on local transport. The priority aim should be to improve the attractiveness of alternatives to the private car, especially public transport, for access to and travel in the charged area.
Although it is proposed that transport will have first call on the revenue stream from charging schemes, legislation need not restrict expenditure entirely to transport-related matters. This is because there could be poor value for money if low priority transport projects were undertaken simply because of restrictions on the use of revenues. Public opinion may opt for the allocation of revenues to other causes such as education and health. On the other hand, the cautious support which the business sectors and motoring groups are beginning to extend to pricing are specifically given on the understanding that revenues will be allocated to transport infrastructure investment, whilst the successful schemes in Norway and Singapore have also been implemented on this basis.
Overall, therefore, there is strong support amongst practitioners for an approach which sees transport revenues ring-fenced and hypothecated within the sector.
On the other hand, economic theory assumes that revenue from road pricing is used to compensate drivers exactly for the fees they have paid. As the overall cost of road travel (i.e. the sum of travel time, vehicle operating costs and money) has risen as a result of charging, this is the only way that an increase in welfare can be achieved. For practical application, economists generally consider that the most effective proxy for this compensation would be the use of road pricing revenues to subsidise general labour or property taxes. The key concern, from an economic efficiency objective, is that revenue should be used in a manner that brings benefit to society, but which does not contribute to economic distortions in the transport sector. Therefore, the one potential use of road pricing revenue which is considered least appropriate is funding increased investment in transport, especially within the road sector.
In contrast, the prospect of raising revenue for desired (but, otherwise, prohibitively expensive) transport projects may be a major factor in motivating the current wave of interest from practitioners in road pricing policies. Indeed, this has always been acknowledged explicitly as the key objective behind the design of the three long-standing Norwegian Toll Rings. Experience suggests that politicians and transport professionals in the field are generally unimpressed by the economic arguments relating to revenue, for two reasons.

  • First, a critical practical issue which needs to be resolved to allow the introduction of road pricing is the provision of feasible alternatives for those who do not wish, or cannot afford, to pay. A major limitation of economic theory is that it tends to focus on long-run impacts, assuming flexibility in land use and lifestyle. However, a major constraint for real-world political decision-makers is the much shorter run of the political cycle. Any potential policy which cannot reap tangible benefits on this timescale is likely to modified or abandoned.
  • Second, politicians are acutely aware of public distrust regarding the introduction of new taxes (or, for that matter, increases to existing taxes), when the revenue is used to contribute to the general (local or national) treasury pot. Many voters perceive this as encouraging governmental inefficiency and, therefore, it is regularly stated that hypothecation of revenues to uses which are both popular and likely to produce visible results, including some uses which bring direct benefits to car drivers, may be the only way to make road pricing widely acceptable.

While the academic arguments have not yet been fully resolved, the pragmatic view suggests that hypothecation of road pricing revenue for financing transport projects is likely to be essential to achieve support from almost any sector of the public. The balance between investment in road and public transport schemes will likewise need to be driven by the desire to seek a practical solution appropriate to the specific location.