|
3.
FINANCE, LEGAL AND IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES
3.1
How to Finance Set-up Costs?
The
cost of establishing a road user charging scheme is likely to be considerable.
Not only are there the physical costs of the necessary infrastructure
and personnel, but there will be a variety of lead-in costs whilst the
scheme is developed, such as public consultation, media campaigns, and
legal/planning costs.
If
a road user charging scheme is implemented wholly within the public sector,
there is a potential problem of timing. While road user charging should
be expected to generate substantial levels of net revenue which can be
used eventually to finance additional transport improvements, there will
of course be no revenue generated until the road user charging scheme
is in place. In some EC member states, public investment in transport
is substantial, and the public sector can drive road user charging forward
without subsidy. In other states, notably the UK, public subsidy has been
driven down in order to reduce personal taxation, and alternative finance
sources are likely to be needed.
This
is one of the main reasons why it might be attractive to seek the participation
of the private sector in establishing a road user charging scheme. Public-private
partnership (PPP), could provide for Õup-frontÕ investment to enable other
transport improvements to be in place before the imposition of road user
charging charges. PPP could be used as the mechanism for procurement of
the scheme, as an alternative to more conventional public sector purchasing.
If this approach is preferred, then it is essential therefore that the
legal and institutional framework in member states allows for such private
sector involvement in the planning of transport schemes. Of course, given
the sensitivity of the issue, the relevant local authorities will wish
remain in close control of any scheme, and private sector input should
be closely regulated.
Moreover, it should be noted that in the UK, where the PPP approach has
become commonplace, there are concerns that the private sector is only
willing to finance projects where a significant profit can be achieved.
The private sector is often highly risk averse, and demands a rate of
return well in excess of that required to justify public investment. Whilst
local authorities are restricted in their ability to invest, they should
be aware that high levels of private investment will require a high rate
of return which may absorb a significant proportion of future revenues.
Private sector investment, therefore, represents a valuable source of
additional finance, but is less economically advisable where a publicly
funded approach can be adopted. A gradual implementation of road pricing
which develops a revenue stream from a low charge level in early years
may help to reduce dependency on private sector investment.
The
various approaches to scheme funding which might be explored are described
as follows:
- Full
Public Private Partnership: the local authority may wish to establish
a separate entity jointly with the private sector, which is able to
implement the road pricing scheme, and develop complementary measures
such as public transport schemes. This type of scheme, where the private
sector takes a substantial level of control over the scheme may represent
a longer term solution, but is unlikely to be acceptable socially until
the concept of road pricing is better established. A further concern
would be that any private sector partner would, presumably, benefit
from tolls collected and, therefore, might wish to promote the use of
the private car to maximise revenues, or to take control of decisions
such as tolling structures.
- Partial
Public Private Partnership: a more acceptable approach would involve
the local authority administering a scheme, but enabling the private
sector to invest in selected elements of the scheme whilst benefiting
from revenues raised. For example, the road pricing scheme might be
privately developed, but leased to the local authority at a fixed rate,
whilst the revenues achieved would be dedicated to lease costs and subsidies
for a private public transport system. The disadvantage of this is that
the private sector will be less likely to accept risk transfer where
it has less control over the revenue stream.
- Privately
financed publicly operated scheme: a more conventional approach would
see the local authority develop the scheme on its own initiative, but
raising private finance to support identified elements of the overall
scheme such as the road pricing system and the public transport scheme
which might be delivered by different contractors. Once again, care
would have to be taken to ensure that private sector partners would
not be encouraged to promote car travel, but that toll revenues would
go directly to the local authority.
- Public
sector investment: a viable road pricing scheme will incur significant
start-up costs before it becomes viable. Only when these costs are met
will any operating surplus be released to support infrastructure investment.
A publicly funded approach, without additional up-front funding, might
be applicable in a city like Singapore, but is less appropriate in a
major European city where road pricing will need to be underpinned by
immediate investment in transport infrastructure, unless significant
additional funding sources are available. The only way in which this
approach could be viable would be to introduce a low level fee to raise
revenues to develop infrastructure and to increase fees to a level capable
of demand management once such infrastructure is in place.
In
the past, PPP schemes have generally been related to a comparatively simple
project such as a single closed system. Whilst it is understandable that
local authorities will wish to seek private investment to fund the public
transport schemes which are required to enable pricing to be deemed acceptable,
further research and demonstration work will be required to determine
which models are most suitable.
3.2
How To Overcome Legal and Institutional Framework Barriers?
The
legal barriers to urban road user charging in the majority of EC member
states are quite specific. Whilst the collection of tolls on designated
highways is legal in most states (although practised to a varying degree),
charging within the urban are is generally not legal. It is difficult
for the individual city to achieve a change in this situation alone. The
Europrice political initiative is one which has assembled a group of cities,
sympathetic to the principle of road pricing, to provide a focus for city/regional
issues to be debated. It is likely that pan-European initiatives of this
kind will help to convince member states that the primary legislation
which is required to enable road use charging should be implemented.
Within the UK, the Transport Bill, which was introduced to the House of
Commons in 1999, will provide the required legislation. In Rome, the Road
code authorises local authorities to introduce road pricing to preserve
the environment of historic cities. States such as Denmark, France and
the Netherlands are currently appraising the options.
Once
the primary legislation is in place, authorities will need to give consideration
to a number of secondary issues:
- Access
control systems must be implemented in a manner which is consistent
with existing legislation.
- Enforcement
systems must be designed not to infringe concerns over data protection
and civil liberties. For this reason, a paper based system which avoids
issues such as vehicle recognition, may provide a short-term solution.
- Once
powers to collect charges are in place, a commitment to the hypothecation
of revenues to transport investment may be required in order to ensure
that the scheme is deemed to be acceptable.
Institutional
barriers are likely to vary greatly between member states. The key issue
to consider is the importance of ensuring a broad base of support for
any scheme at the outset. This can only achieved by a process of consensus
building whereby the proposals are supported by the key actors and by
the public. Success will depend greatly on the existing structures within
the area. It is likely that a series of key actors will need to co-operate
effectively. These may include (Table 4.1).
Table
3.1: Key Operators and their Significance Institution Significance
| Institution |
Significance |
| National
Government |
Prepare
primary legislation to enable pricing |
| Regional
Government |
Prepare
regional policy to permit pricing |
| Local
Government |
Prepare
and plan scheme and raise and administer finance |
| Transport
Authority |
Planning of services to enable access to areas affected by pricing
|
| Planning
Authority |
Development
of land-use planning approach to reinforce pricing |
| Transport
Operators |
Provision
of services to enable access to areas affected by pricing |
| Emergency
Services |
Development
of procedures to ensure that pricing infrastructure does not impede
access |
This
list is not exhaustive, and will take a different form in every urban
area. The important lesson is to ensure that at the outset all actors
are identified, and that a forum for effective communication is established.
This may require moderation by a neutral expert such as a local academic
or consultant, and should be established well in advance of the development
of any scheme. The purpose of the forum is to ensure that all potential
barriers are identified and resolved in good time. Where significant financial
investment of participatory processes must be undertaken in order to overcome
such barriers, the partners should be all kept well informed of the processes
to be completed in order to distinguish between complex problems which
are being addressed, and problems which may be outstanding.
Road
pricing is likely to be most easily implemented in a city in which planning
and transport powers are vested in a single authority. This is a barrier
which may be difficult to overcome where it exists. If powers are held
by a variety of authorities, a formal partnership may be needed to implement
road pricing in a co-ordinated manner.
Pricing
is most commonly seen as a solution for large urban areas. This can pose
a severe problem when the area comprises a series of individual local
authorities. These authorities may be autonomous, and may have very different
policy approaches. In such an instance, it may be preferable for the lead
to be taken by a regional or sub-regional authority which has over-arching
responsibilities in order to seek to incorporate objectively the views
of each smaller area. Scheme promoters must be aware that in such cases
the risk of withdrawal of a single partner can leave a gap in a cordon
or area-based charging scheme, rendering the scheme impractical. Urban
agglomerations are, therefore, particularly vulnerable to political change.
An example is the experience of London. Following the abolition in 1986
of the Greater London Council, transport issues have been addressed by
individual Borough Councils. Whilst these co-operate on many practical
issues, consensus building in support of transport is very difficult to
achieve. The election in 2000 of a single Mayor for London and the creation
of the Greater London Authority and Transport for London has helped to
overcome these barriers by providing a single decision-making body.
An example of a barrier which still prevails in the UK is the deregulation
of public transport provision outside London. Since local authorities
have very limited influence over services and fares, it is exceedingly
difficult to ensure that adequate services will be in place to provide
a suitable alternative to car usage after pricing is introduced. Local
authorities can invest in physical infrastructure such as LRT systems,
but are less able to develop bus networks, other than by entering into
quality partnerships with co-operative operators.
The following guidance on successful implementation was prepared for the
Final Report of the CAPTURE project (Table 4.2).
Table
3.2: Guidance on Successful Overcoming Institutional Barriers
One
of the major findings of the CAPTURE project was that what is planned
is often not implemented. This seems like a very obvious statement,
but in most monitoring and research only that which is implemented is
studied and that which is not is ignored. In CAPTURE a decision was
taken to accept that some elements (or entire plans) were not being
implemented and look for the reasons why, and suggest ways in which
mistakes could be lessened in the future. The basic steps in design
should include:
- Gaining
consensus for the need for change - There is a need for consultation
and participation by key actors, and the public. In general this stage
may be relatively easy, but it is important that all bodies involved
in decision making understand to goals of projects such as to effect
a modal shift
- Gaining
consensus over methods for solving agreed ÔproblemsÕ - this stage
is more complex. While there is a general consensus that it Òwould
be a good thingÓ to reduce dependence on the car and to encourage
people to use other modes, there may be widely differing views about
how to achieve that goal. It is at this stage that consultation with
the public is of utmost importance, in order to educate those affected
both in terms of what the schemes will actually involve, and how they
are designed to improve conditions. It is important that such consultation
is done at an early stage so that suggestions from local people can
be incorporated (and with very local knowledge they may be better
solutions than local authorities or outside consultants can provide),
and that the consultation does not just result in hostility to a scheme
that has become imprinted as the only solution to those proposing
it.
- Adopting
a plan with a Ôlogically arguable likelihoodÕ of success - It is often
apparent (particularly in hindsight) that many schemes put forward
and put into action were never likely to succeed in the goals they
set out to achieve. Any scheme which gets as far as being formally
proposed should be capable of withstanding critical analysis of its
likely success in achieving its goals if it is implemented.
- Consideration
of the likelihood of adoption - While the actual conditions which
determine whether or not a scheme will see its way to completion are
complex it is apparent that some sort of local assessment of the likelihood
of adoption should be made. Learning from past mistakes, delays, and
suchlike is crucial, and in general, assessments of these kinds will
be made, but with the belief that Òthings will be different this timeÓ.
Of course some measures may be essential to a strategy but will be
described as having a very low likelihood of success. Perhaps some
of the more controversial elements should be piloted in areas where
they are likely to be implemented in order to give them a higher chance
of success elsewhere.
- Ensurance
that overall goals are not prejudiced by possible or likely changes
to detail - contingency plan - an example of this problem on a large
scale is the Sheffield Supertram system in the UK which was originally
designed in a planned public transport system to act as the ÔbackboneÕ
to the system. But after the design stage the UK government brought
in its deregulation of the bus industry which meant that the system
was in competition (on price and service levels) with bus services
which, from many key locations were able to access the city centre
much faster and more cheaply.
- Cohesive
management of plans - it is important that plans are constantly overseen
towards their conclusion. If key personnel change more than is absolutely
necessary some key understandings of the project will be lost.
It
could be said that it is impossible to decide how to proceed from where
we are without agreeing on the goal, and certainly in many senses, this
is true. Clear direction and strategy can only be created by actors
who are clear and have a common understanding about the end goal. It
is this lack of a common vision concerning an end state for transport
policy which has been responsible for the lack of progress towards a
sensible transport strategy. It is also true that if direction is agreed,
then strategies can be defined, and it is here that there is more scope
for consensus.
4.
ASSESMENT OF ROADPRICING
4.1
Why Pricing Should be Considered
4.1.1
Why Reduce Car Usage?
Car
ownership and car usage have increased, and continue to increase significantly
across almost all European cities. The need for efficient transport systems
and personal mobility is recognised as a vital element of modern day life.
Increasingly, however, people are becoming concerned about the impact
of these transport systems upon their health, their safety, the local
environment, and the global environment. In addition, traffic congestion
has a major economic impact, accounting for some 2% of the gross domestic
product (GDP) of the European Union (EU) every year.
The
environmental problem can be summarised as follows:
- The
transport sector is responsible for one third of European energy consumption,
and its share is increasing
- Increasing
energy demand in the transport sector is almost entirely due to the
growth in road traffic, particularly the use of the private car.
- The
energy consumed in transport is supplied almost exclusively by oil products
- The
burning of oil products is responsible for the emission of large quantities
of pollutants that are harmful to human health, and contribute significantly
to global warming
- During
the last 15 years, the energy consumed by urban transport has increased
four times more quickly than for inter-urban transport
Research
has suggested that it is possible to increase the use of public transport
significantly, thereby reducing private vehicle traffic, by implementing
integrated packages of measures designed to improve service quality and
performance. Even greater reductions in energy and emissions could be
achieved if private car traffic is restrained by either physical or fiscal
measures.
4.1.2
The Role of Pricing as a Means to Reduce Car Usage
Charging
is not the solution of our traffic problems. It is not even a solution,
but may form a key part of an integrated strategy, which consists of different
instruments. There is neither a ready-made solution, nor the one solution,
but there are different options, discussed in section 2.2, which may be
implemented depending on given situations and general conditions. Nevertheless;
incentives can contribute to an efficient solution of the existing problems,
if they are applied meaningful and in combination with further measures.
To limit the negative consequences of urban traffic (e.g. heavy congestion,
air pollution, environmental damage, noise etc.) first of all technique-based
modifications on the supply side were used.
For
instance:
- reduction
of vehicles' energy consumption;
- reduction
of emissions produced by vehicles;
-
improvements in safety of cars and roads;
-
telematic applications which improve the effectiveness of traffic etc.
Whilst
these technological options reduce the negative impacts of traffic (growth)
to some extent, they can not eliminate it completely. Therefore increasingly
behaviour-influencing measures on the demand side, are being discussed
(OECD, 1997).
An
alternative definition of the ways in the impact of car usage can be reduced,
these are commonly called Ôthe three EÕsÕ (Schlag, 1998), is described
below:
- Enforcement:
legal measures, mainly rules and bans, as behaviour-influencing preconditions
for a guarantee of a safe traffic and transport;
- Engineering:
an altered arrangement of supply, affecting the routes for the different
means of transport as well as the means of transport themselves;
- Education:
measures of education, instruction and information of - first and foremost
- the vehicle drivers.
As
a further possibility for influencing mobility, a fourth ÔEÕ is to be
considered: fiscal incentives, such as road user fees named ÔEncouragementÕ
or ÔEconomyÕ. Within other areas, e.g. telecommunications or energy use
(Bell et al., 1996), pricing systems have proved to be very effective
control means.
Transport policies have in the past focused largely on direct regulation
(enforcement). Whilst rules have brought significant improvements in some
areas (e.g. safety), they have not been able to unlock the full potential
of response options that can be triggered through price signals. Price
based policies give citizens and businesses incentives to find solutions
for certain problems. The objective of ensuring sustainable transport
requires that prices reflect underlying scarcities which otherwise would
not be taken into account sufficiently. Decisions made by individuals
with respect to their choice of mode, their location and investments are
at least partly based on prices. So prices have to be reasonable to improve
transport.
In
general the following fiscal elements can be identified within the cost
of mobility (cp. Schlag, 1998, 309):
- Capital
and vehicle taxes - purchase and saleÕs taxes, value-added tax (VAT),
motorcar tax (annual), costs of the acquisition of the driving licence.
-
indirect running taxes, which enable the access to the use of a road
space and which are not to be paid in direct connection with the traffic
behaviour. E.g. fuel tax, resident parking fees, monthly ticket for
public transport, motorway fees (for goods- and passenger-transport)
cordon tolls, road and bridge tolls - as long as not referred to single
passages or drives (monthly tickets etc.)
- direct
taxes (referred to use), which are limited to the individual range of
use (spatial and/or temporal). E.g. taxi costs, parking fees (per time
of use), ticket for public transport (per trip), weight-distance-fees
for lorries and busses, cordon tolls, road and bridge tolls - referred
to single passages and drives, automatically measured road using fees.
4.1.3
Effectiveness of Pricing Measures to Reduce Car Usage
In
order to influence mobility behaviour, direct user fees like road pricing
which have to be paid in connection with the personal road use are particularly
effective. In general the influence of price incentives may refer to different
levels of the decision hierarchy of road users. Rothengatter (1994) mentions
a multiplicity of decision levels, which can reach from impacts on route
choice, travel time, journey frequencies, driving widths and impacts on
modal split and vehicle selection up to a modification of residence choice.
More specifically, the various behavioural dimensions determining external
costs (and thus problems) in urban transport would be optimally affected
by theoretical (and so-called) "first-best" pricing measures, if only
such measures were possible and applicable. However, on the basis of at
present available pricing measures it is difficult to distinguish between
types of infrastructure users and categories of external costs the users
generate. Thus, the measures up to date can only be called "second-best"
measures as they only partially lead to the behavioural responses which
would be elicited by "first-best" measures. Table 5.1 shows to which extent
some possible second-best instruments allow for differentiation between
important behavioural dimensions. A distinction is made between an unlikely
direct impact, a possible direct impact, a likely direct impact (possibly
approaching first-best standards), and finally the first-best bench-mark.
Table
4.1: Dependence of various behavioural dimensions on various pricing instruments
(Milne et al., 1999, p. 66).
|
|
Car use
|
Car ownership
|
Spatial behaviourb
|
|
|
Vehicle kilometres
|
Number
of trips
|
Time
of driving (peak or off-peak)
|
Place of driving (area or route)
|
Driving style
|
Fleet
Sizea
|
Vehicle technology
|
|
|
First-best bench-mark
|
***
|
***
|
***
|
***
|
***
|
***
|
***
|
***
|
|
Second-best direct demand management
ERP per km
Parking fees
Toll booths
ERP Cordon
Peak permits
Area licences
Fuel taxes
|
**
*
*
*
*
*
**
|
**
**
**
**
*
*
**
|
**
-
*
**
*
*
-
|
*
*/-
*
*
*
*
-
|
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
|
**
*
**
**
**
**
**
|
-
-
-
-
-
*
**
|
**
*
*
*
*/-
**
**
|
|
Indirect demand management
Vehicle taxes
Subsidising public transport
Subsidising tele-working
Location subsidies/taxes
|
*
*
*
*
|
*
*
**
-
|
-
-
*
-
|
-
*/-
*/-
*/-
|
-
-
-
-
|
**
*
*
-
|
see#
-
-
-
|
-
*
-
*
|
|
Supply-side oriented policies
Differentiated vehicle taxes
Differentiated fuel taxes
|
-
-
|
-
-
|
-
-
|
-
-
|
-
-
|
-
-
|
**#
**
|
-
-
|
***optimal
(first-best) impact
**
likely direct impact, possibly approaching first-best standards
* possible direct impact
Ð no particularly strong direct impact, or at least unlikely in practice
a Also allows for car size.
b Location of residence vs. work and leisure activities. Second-best pricing
measures with their imperfect power to differentiate cannot provide perfect
incentives for infrastructure users in relation to the external costs
they are generating. Also, there is no reason to believe that such measures
would be sufficient to secure optimality of long-run developments in mobility
behaviour. Therefore, besides second-best pricing, there may be a need
for complementary policies to affect long-run decisions concerning the
factors behind the long-run position and shape of the relevant demand
in a socially desirable manner.
4.2
What is the impact of charging on traffic and the economy?
4.2.1
Traffic Flows
Operational
benefits from changes in traffic flows result primarily from the improvement
in road operating conditions when users divert to other forms of transport
or to other periods. Reduced vehicle kilometres will also result in accident
benefits, although these may be offset by increases in vehicle speeds
due to a reduction in congestion.
Additional benefits will be achieved due to reduced environmental impacts
including air quality and noise, as well as an improvement in the urban
environment.
Pricing schemes can achieve significant reductions in traffic flows as
identified in the following examples:
Examples
of reduction is traffic due to pricing
The
Singapore ERP system Ð the most complete and relevant example of Road
User Charging - has expressway gantries which operate during the morning
rush hours from 7.30 am to 9.30 am from Mondays to Fridays in the direction
of flow to the city. Traffic volumes during the ERP period have dropped
by about 15%. There is a slight spreading of the peak hour traffic as
some vehicles take advantage of the lower charges between 7.30 am Ð
8.00 am and 9.00 am Ð 9.30 am. Weekday charges vary from route to route
depending on the time of day. These benefits have been achieved in addition
to the impact of the original Singapore Area charging scheme which saw
a 50% reduction in AM peak flows with an 83% increase in bus patronage
from 1975 to 1992.
Reductions
in traffic flow in Trondheim were substantially lower in the order of
5-7%, but these were based upon tolls set to raise revenues rather than
to control car usage. Higher tolls were trialled during the CONCERT
project, achieving reductions of 10-17%. The use of varying tolls for
different vehicles classes, or for setting lower tolls for a high occupancy
vehicle lane may enable the system to further optimise conditions for
selected classes of road user.
4.2.2
Economic Benefits
The
economic benefits of road pricing will vary in accordance with the approach
taken to scheme design. A scheme is likely to seek to achieve one or more
of the following objectives:
- To
raise revenues
- To
deter the use of the private car
- To
ensure that travellers meet the true cost of their journey in an equitable
manner
Each
of these objectives will lead to economic benefits either directly, through
gaining revenue, or indirectly, through improvements to the economy achieved
by reducing congestion.
The CUPID Consortium is in the process if identifying the full range of
economic impacts of pricing schemes as part of the development of Deliverable
4, Evaluation Framework. Table 7 provides a breakdown of key economic
indicators.
Some of these indicators, such as revenues raised, can be readily expressed
as financial values. Others, such as the impact on employment, are less
tangible.
Beyond this table lies the full range of socio-economic, environmental
and other impacts, many of which are complex to identify in monetary terms,
but which make up the wider impact of pricing. The identification and
appraisal of these impacts will be a central element in the work of CUPID
over the coming years.
Table
4.2: Provisional List of Economic Indicators
| Economic
|
Direct
financial |
Investment
cost
Support infrastructure cost
Level of initial external investment
Labour cost
Maintenance cost
Level of ongoing public subsidy needed
Operating revenues
Profitability |
| |
Employment |
Temporary
jobs provided by installation of demonstration
Long-term jobs provided by operation of demonstration
Indirect, long-term jobs |
| |
Regional
development |
Long
term impact of measure on economy
Regional access issues
Change in conditions for shopping
Change in conditions for tourism
Vitality
Overall trade |
The
use of road pricing to reduce congestion can offer great benefits both
through direct costs and indirect costs both to businesses and residents.
The direct reduction in time spent in delays will have a knock-on effect
on business efficiency and consumer pricing whilst the improved environment
will provide a healthier, more attractive, city, which is likely to help
to encourage inward investment. The OECD estimated that 4.1% of GDP was
lost to transport externalities in 1994: road pricing may help to reduce
this figure.
A longer term social objective, proposed in the White Paper on Fair and
Efficient Pricing, is to ensure that all travellers meet the full cost
to society of their journeys. For example, in the UK, motorway carry 17%
of all vehicle kilometres, but the cost of motorway congestion is only
1% of the total. Conversely, the 1% of vehicle kilometres represented
by urban centre peak hour traffic, are responsible for 13% of all congestion
costs. Existing fiscal measures such as fuel and vehicles taxation do
not reflect these differences. Road User Charging can ensure that travel
choices reflect the real cost of travel, rather than perceived cost in
order to encourage economically efficient behaviour.
The economic benefits to society can be maximised by developing varying
tolls which favour essential road users such as public transport, freight
or high occupancy vehicles.
4.2.3
Assessment of Potential Benefits
Extensive
work has been undertaken to assess the potential benefits of pricing.
In the UK, studies and trials of road pricing have been undertaken in
Bristol, Leicester and London. The Bristol ELGAR trials, part of the CONCERT
project, and the LERTS system in Leicester included real-life trials of
modal choice amongst travellers offered the option between the use of
the private car and bus-based park and ride. Complementary measures such
as variable message sign information on environmental conditions and sliding
scales for tolls have been considered. Progress in the UK is now delayed,
awaiting the introduction of powers to enable the collection of area tolls,
and to permit hypothecation, the direct allocation of funds from tolls
to transport infrastructure.
These trials, and an ongoing trial in Bristol for the INTERCEPT project,
provide an insight into the public reaction to pricing, but do not enable
the longer-term impacts to be assessed. Major decisions, such as whether
or not to replace a car, may only be made on a cycle of 3-5 years or even
more, and so it is only be means of true demonstration that an accurate
long-run assessment of impact can be provided.
Extensive analysis of the impact of pricing has also been undertaken by
means of the use of transport models. The advantage of this approach is
that the model provides a desk-top assessment on impacts. In some ways
this is very helpful as data such as the potential revenues can be identified
and used to determine the wider infrastructure measures which might be
implemented. Models also provide a first estimate of the charge levels
which might be required in order to achieve a specific change in behaviour.
A comprehensive review of these issues can be found in the EC supported
TASTe Guidelines on the Use of Tools for Assessing Traffic Demand Management
Strategies.
4.3
How to Use Road Capacity and Revenues Obtained by Implementing Road Pricing
4.3.1
Use of Road Capacity
There
are two approaches to the use of road capacity obtained by implementing
road pricing. One option is that the road network can be reduced in scale
to reflect the reduction in traffic due to road pricing. The road space
released may be allocated to public transport as a dedicated corridor,
reserved for high occupancy vehicles, or reserved for non-motorised modes
or transport. Alternatively the space may be developed either for environmental
improvements, or to support local economic activity. This is a highly
idealised solution. In reality, road pricing schemes are likely only to
address the most severe impacts on congestion in city centres. Therefore
any reduction in traffic will help to reduce congestion in the short to
medium term, but will not necessarily enable the reduction in highway
capacity. The key benefit of road pricing to the business sector is that
it enables efficient access for goods and people, and measures to reduce
such access are likely to result in a loss of support from this sector.
This approach has been adopted in Singapore where restrictions of vehicle
access have been accompanied by the continuing development of high quality
public transport alternatives.
The alternative, therefore, is that the spare road capacity is used to
improve traffic conditions. The improvements will help to limit the economic
impacts of congestion, whilst they will also achieve environmental benefits
by reducing the impacts of congestion on air quality. This is the approach
which is currently seen in Europe, both in the pricing systems in Norway,
as well as the use of road tolls in France and elsewhere.
4.3.2
Use of Revenues
The
revenues from congestion charging may be used in three ways:
- They
can remain within the road transport sector and therefore benefit those
who pay them: this will reduce congestion but not control car usage
- revenues
could be used for financing other parts of a comprehensive strategy
to deal with congestion (e.g. route guidance systems, public transport
etc,).
-
Alternatively, these revenues would allow other taxes which are currently
used for the public financing of infrastructure but which are largely
unrelated to the costs of infrastructure use to be allocated to other
purposes, or to be cut.
In
the long run, congestion charging holds out the prospect of reforming
transport taxation in a manner that would greatly increase the efficiency
and equity of our transport system.
It could be argued that a congestion charging scheme which subsidises
new roads, and thereby attracts more users is actually failing to resolve
the problems it is intended to address. On the other hand, in many cities,
road pricing is intended to do exactly that. If the Road User Charging
scheme too attractive to a motorist, he or she will not consider the public
transport alternative unless more road space is re-allocated to rapid
transit systems. Segregating public transport routes from other road traffic
will increase efficiency by reducing delays caused by congestion. If this
increased efficiency is visible to motorists and is a result of road space
being taken away from them, they are more likely to think about using
public transport.
Visible hypothecation of Road User Charging revenues to public transport
alternatives is vital to combat public opposition to congestion charging
schemes. Revenues may be used to improve or introduce modal interchange
facilities, for example park and ride facilities located on the periphery
of the charged area would provide an alternative means of access. The
increased volume parking and interchange activity to be expected at such
interchange points needs to be estimated and accommodate in a safe and
efficient manner.
Responses to the 1997 consultation in the UK on developing an integrated
transport policy indicated a very strong feeling that if Road User Charging
was to be introduced, the net revenue should be retained by local authorities
and spent on local transport. The priority aim should be to improve the
attractiveness of alternatives to the private car, especially public transport,
for access to and travel in the charged area.
Although it is proposed that transport will have first call on the revenue
stream from charging schemes, legislation need not restrict expenditure
entirely to transport-related matters. This is because there could be
poor value for money if low priority transport projects were undertaken
simply because of restrictions on the use of revenues. Public opinion
may opt for the allocation of revenues to other causes such as education
and health. On the other hand, the cautious support which the business
sectors and motoring groups are beginning to extend to pricing are specifically
given on the understanding that revenues will be allocated to transport
infrastructure investment, whilst the successful schemes in Norway and
Singapore have also been implemented on this basis.
Overall, therefore, there is strong support amongst practitioners for
an approach which sees transport revenues ring-fenced and hypothecated
within the sector.
On the other hand, economic theory assumes that revenue from road pricing
is used to compensate drivers exactly for the fees they have paid. As
the overall cost of road travel (i.e. the sum of travel time, vehicle
operating costs and money) has risen as a result of charging, this is
the only way that an increase in welfare can be achieved. For practical
application, economists generally consider that the most effective proxy
for this compensation would be the use of road pricing revenues to subsidise
general labour or property taxes. The key concern, from an economic efficiency
objective, is that revenue should be used in a manner that brings benefit
to society, but which does not contribute to economic distortions in the
transport sector. Therefore, the one potential use of road pricing revenue
which is considered least appropriate is funding increased investment
in transport, especially within the road sector.
In contrast, the prospect of raising revenue for desired (but, otherwise,
prohibitively expensive) transport projects may be a major factor in motivating
the current wave of interest from practitioners in road pricing policies.
Indeed, this has always been acknowledged explicitly as the key objective
behind the design of the three long-standing Norwegian Toll Rings. Experience
suggests that politicians and transport professionals in the field are
generally unimpressed by the economic arguments relating to revenue, for
two reasons.
- First,
a critical practical issue which needs to be resolved to allow the introduction
of road pricing is the provision of feasible alternatives for those
who do not wish, or cannot afford, to pay. A major limitation of economic
theory is that it tends to focus on long-run impacts, assuming flexibility
in land use and lifestyle. However, a major constraint for real-world
political decision-makers is the much shorter run of the political cycle.
Any potential policy which cannot reap tangible benefits on this timescale
is likely to modified or abandoned.
- Second,
politicians are acutely aware of public distrust regarding the introduction
of new taxes (or, for that matter, increases to existing taxes), when
the revenue is used to contribute to the general (local or national)
treasury pot. Many voters perceive this as encouraging governmental
inefficiency and, therefore, it is regularly stated that hypothecation
of revenues to uses which are both popular and likely to produce visible
results, including some uses which bring direct benefits to car drivers,
may be the only way to make road pricing widely acceptable.
While
the academic arguments have not yet been fully resolved, the pragmatic
view suggests that hypothecation of road pricing revenue for financing
transport projects is likely to be essential to achieve support from almost
any sector of the public. The balance between investment in road and public
transport schemes will likewise need to be driven by the desire to seek
a practical solution appropriate to the specific location.
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